


UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE PRIOR SERVICE RECRUITING:  
A FUTURE COMMAND FOR PARTIALLY MANNING THE RESERVES



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2013

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE PRIOR SERVICE RECRUITING: A FUTURE COMMAND FOR PARTIALLY MANNING THE RESERVES, by Major Daniel W. Laux, 117 pages.

Conducted research in order to answer the primary research question of whether the current model for partially populating the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) through Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) is ideally commanded and controlled by the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), while simultaneously providing career enhancing opportunities for the AR Marines who successfully perform on PSR duty. This study examines the current PSR construct from the perspective of personnel from the supporting and supported commands, as well as from the cadre of Active Reserve officers who are assignable as the senior MCR representatives within the current recruiting task organization. The study was conducted through surveys and document review. The study revealed that the consolidation of the total force recruiting construct under MCRC capitalized on economizing existing recruiting leadership, though at a cost of minimizing MCR buy-in towards the execution of a portion of its Title 10 responsibilities.

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## ACRONYMS

AGR	Active Guard Reserve (Army)
AR	Active Reserve (USMC)
ARCD	Army Reserve Careers Division
CG	Commanding General
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CO	Commanding Officer
DOD	Department of Defense
FTS	Full-Time Support
FY	Fiscal Year
HQ	Headquarters
HQMC	Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
I&I	Inspector-Instructor
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs, (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps)
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MFR	Marine Forces Reserve
MCD	Marine Corps District
MCRC	Marine Corps Recruiting Command
MCR	Marine Corps Reserve
MSO	Military Service Obligation
NPS	Non-Prior Service (personnel)
PS	Prior Service (personnel)
PSR	Prior Service Recruiting

PSRS	Prior Service Recruiting Station
RA	Reserve Affairs
RAM	Reserve Affairs Manpower Management
RC	Reserve Component
RS	Recruiting Station
RSCO	Recruiting Station Commanding Officer
SMCR	Selected Marine Corps Reserve
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
U.S.C.	United States Code
USMC	United States Marine Corps

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Although reshaping the Marine Corps from 202,100 Marines to a force of approximately 182,100 Marines entails some risk to our ability to simultaneously respond to multiple large contingencies, it is manageable. We intend to leverage the diverse depth and range of our Reserve component both to mitigate risk and maximize opportunities where available.

— Gen James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps,  
*2012 Report to Congress*

#### Problem Statement

The United States Marine Corps is comprised of the total force, represented by both the regular and reserve components. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) is responsible for a myriad of substantive issues which set conditions for the existence of the robust, war-fighting organization, which remains ready to answer America's call. According to United State Code (U.S.C.) Title 10, Subtitle C, Part I, Chapter 506, § 5042 (Headquarters Marine Corps; general duties), among the CMC's principal responsibilities are "the preparation for such employment of the Marine Corps, and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining of the Marine Corps."<sup>1</sup> Of the host of key tasks to which the CMC adheres in the execution of his duties, recruiting accounts for the execution of the non-prior service (NPS) enlisted and officer accessions, as well as the facilitation of prior service (PS) reenlistments and/or reappointments of enlisted and officer personnel into the regular and reserve components.<sup>2</sup> Presently, the Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) exercises command and control over all Marine Corps recruiting

activities, to include Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) of experienced Marines into the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR).<sup>3</sup> CG, MCRC gained command and control of PSR in FY 2004, after one year of executing operational control (OPCON) during FY 2003.<sup>4</sup> Depicted in figure 1, the NPS and PS Marine Corps recruiting mission is represented by the total force recruiting construct. Regarding the recruiting mission as a whole, active component recruiters assigned to one of 48 Marine Corps Recruiting Stations (RS) across the country recruit regular and reserve NPS applicants into the entry-level, training pipeline.<sup>5</sup> Reserve NPS Marines arrive at reserve units for duty upon graduation from recruit training and subsequent completion of requisite Marine combat training and military occupational specialty (MOS) training. Figure 2 depicts the current Marine Corps recruiting chain of command.




Figure 1. Total Force USMC Recruiting

*Source:* Daniel Choike and Mike Zeliff, "Marine Corps Recruiting Command and RAND Study Group," June 2008, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/conference/rand/ChoikeZeliffPresentation.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2012).




Figure 2. U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Chain of Command

*Source:* Created by author. Information gleaned from United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for Recruiting Station Operations, Volume III* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, March 2004); United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for the Prior Service Recruiter, Volume VIII* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, April 2011).

All officer and enlisted personnel assigned to PSR duty are sourced from the Active Reserve (AR) program.<sup>6</sup> PSR officers and enlisted personnel assigned to Prior Service Recruiting Stations (PSRS) across the country conduct the mission of recruiting PS Marines for subsequent affiliation and service within the MCR.<sup>7</sup> During fiscal year (FY) 12, PSR Marines accomplished the annual reserve affiliation mission by affiliating 4,210 reserve officers and enlisted Marines into reserve units.<sup>8</sup> Although PSR has been successful within MCRC's current task organization and mission since FY04, its yearly success did not come as a direct result of its subordination to, or task organization within MCRC. PSRs successful yearly results since 1982 demonstrates the strength in PSRs ability to achieve its mission in partially populating the MCR while formerly under the command and control of the Commander, MFR, as well as since being assigned under CG, MCRC.<sup>9</sup>

#### The Mission of the MCR and its Place as an Operational Reserve

In order to frame the problem and amplify the significance of this study, it is imperative to understand the operational role of the MCR of today. Prior to the reserve call-up for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, "it had not been necessary for any president to call reservists to active duty in over two decades, causing many observers to believe that reservists would not be called for any reason short of global conflict."<sup>10</sup> With the demise of the former strategic reserve paradigm and the war fighting ability of the military reserves proven by their performance during the Gulf War, the conditions were set for an increase in the use of military reserves, thus more of an operational reserve.<sup>11</sup> The mobilization of the reserves presented a renewed reality in the allocation of combat

forces, which had been dormant for a number of years. “Commonly held assumptions regard the continued operational use of reserves as sustainable and an economical alternative to active forces given a defense budget that is increasingly constrained.”<sup>12</sup> The utilization of an operational reserve has remained critical with regard to the Marine Corps’ ability to viably contribute to global contingencies. The contribution of the MCR to overseas contingency operations over the preceding 12 years has been based on the ability to operationally mobilize reserve units and/or individual augments. The operational reserve concept has been defined by access to the reserve forces, provided by the critical driver of the U.S.C. Title 10.<sup>13</sup> In light of the current and planned drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, “recent mobilization authority legislation in the form of 12304b contained in Title 10 facilitates the RC’s ability to continue to function in an operational role and serve as ‘an institutional shock absorber’ for the total force for predictable, routine, non-contingency unit involuntary activations.”<sup>14</sup> The recent CMC-directed force structure review group, initiated in 2010, planned ahead for the future of the Marine Corps, maintained the size of the reserves, as well as validated the operational reserve concept. The force structure review process also yielded the desire for growth in particular reserve units and skill-sets.<sup>15</sup> In light of the reality of congressionally mandated constraints and in keeping with the CMCs guidance, Marine Forces Reserve’s (MFR) purpose and mission remains “to augment and reinforce the active component with trained units and individual Marines as a sustainable and ready operational reserve in order to augment and reinforce active forces for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement.”<sup>16</sup> The composition of the current and desired MCR is contingent upon aggressive, responsive recruiting via the PSR force.

## The Composition and Role of the MCR PSR Force

Integral to answering the primary research question is an understanding of what comprises the current PSR force. The PSR mission is accomplished through the AR personnel assigned to PSR billets. The Marine Corps' AR program comes directly from U.S.C. Title 10. In addition to providing each of the Armed Forces authorized personnel end strengths for a Selected Reserve Force, U.S.C. Title 10 provides each service additional resources to organize, administer, recruit, instruct and train the RC.<sup>17</sup> The AR program is comprised of 2,261 total officers and enlisted Marines, serving the role of the full-time support (FTS) element of the MCR. The AR program, facilitated by its federal mandate, exists in part to support the recruitment of the MCR.<sup>18</sup> Depicted in Table 1 is the fiscal year (FY) 2013 RC end strength and corresponding FTS personnel numbers within the DOD. The AR program accounts for 5.7 percent of the total end strength of the authorized selected reserve force authorization for the MCR.<sup>19</sup> Although the other services' reserves on full-time active duty in support of the reserve have fluctuated since 30 September 2005, the number of AR Marines authorized by law has remained constant, minimally over the preceding seven years.<sup>20</sup>

Table 1. FY 2013 Reserve Force Authorization		
SERVICE	SELECTED RESERVE FORCE AUTHORIZATION	RESERVES ON FULL-TIME ACTIVE DUTY IN SUPPORT OF RESERVE AUTHORIZATION
Army National Guard	358,200	32,060
Army Reserve	205,000	16,277
Naval Reserve	62,500	10,114
Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve	178,100	17,193
Marine Corps Reserve	39,600	2,261

Source: Department of Defense, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2013*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/mil.pdf> (accessed 2 January 2013).

From the perspective of support to the MCR, the AR program fills its congressionally authorized end strength through a unique application of sourcing billets in support of a variety of types of commands. There are generally three groups of command types in which AR billets are structured: (1) in direct support of the MCR, (2) in operational active duty units or joint commands, and (3) in headquarters indirectly in support of the MCR.<sup>21</sup> Of the total number of AR billets which are assigned through the AR manpower management assignments process, the greatest percentage subset of personnel are assigned to PSR billets within MCRC. Noted in the August 2012 AR authorized strength report (ASR), MCRCs PSR structure maintains 146 billets, in the form of officers, career recruiters, canvassing recruiters, operations and supply Marines, and administrative Marines.<sup>22</sup> Table 2 depicts the personnel allocations by location and MOS, which the AR program provides MCRC for the PSR mission. The percentage of

AR personnel assigned to PSR demonstrates the importance in the mission of partially manning the reserves with PS personnel, with 6.5 percent of total AR structure aligned to it.<sup>23</sup>

UNIT	0111	3043	8006	8411	8412	Total
12th MCD PSRS	1	1	1	18	6	27
1st MCD PSRS	1	1	1	12	5	20
4th MCD PSRS	1	1	1	13	5	21
6th MCD PSRS	1	1	1	13	5	21
8th MCD PSRS	1	1	1	13	5	21
9th MCD PSRS	1	1	1	12	5	20
ERR G-3, PSR			1		3	4
WRR G-3, PSR			1		2	3
MCRC G-3, PSR Section	1		3		5	9
Total	7	6	11	81	41	146

*Source:* United States Marine Corps, *August 2012 Active Reserve Authorized Strength Report (ASR)* (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps). Electronic correspondence with author, 28 November 2012.

Mirror-imaging the geographic expanse of MCRC district areas of operation, one PSRS exists under the district's command and control, to carry out the PSR mission. PSR recruits in support of the reserve units which reside within the MCD's area, striving to populate units' vacancies.<sup>24</sup> Several Prior Service Recruiting Substations (PSRSS) are aligned within the PSRSSs (or district's) area of responsibility.<sup>25</sup> Active component RSSs conduct the NPS recruiting mission only within a portion of the MCD's area of operation, whereas the PSRS covers the district's entire area. Figure 3 represents the MCD areas of responsibility, as well as where in the given MCD that the PSRS HQ is located. With

respect to the assignment of AR personnel within the PSRS, there are between 20 and 27 total personnel assigned. Table 3 represents an example of an operational PSRS' personnel structure.




Figure 3. Map of USMC PSR HQ Locations

*Source:* Created by author. Map depicting MCRCs district boundaries and the location of each of the six PSRS headquarters responsible for the MCR PSR missions.

Table 3. Example MCR Prior Service Recruiting Station Personnel						
Rank	MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY					Total
	0111 Admin Chief	3043 Supply Chief	8006 Officer-in- Charge	8411 Canvassing Recruiter	8412 Career Recruiter (Area SNCOIC, Ops Chief, Recruiter Instructor)	
Sgt	1	1				2
SSgt				12		12
GySgt					4	4
MSgt					1	1
Major			1			1

*Source:* United States Marine Corps, *August 2012 Active Reserve Authorized Strength Report (ASR)* (Quantico, VA.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps). Electronic correspondence with author, 28 November 2012.

The Officer-in-Charge of a PSRS is an AR officer who is assigned to PSR duty without the rigor of a selection process, whereas an active component RS Commanding Officer is selected for that duty from a board which considers all Majors or Majors (select), available for the assignment within the next year.<sup>26</sup> An example of the rigor is gleaned from the FY 2013 USMC RS Commanding Officer selection board, comprised of 13 senior officers, to include three General Officers, which screened 581 officers, selecting 15 primaries and 12 alternates, with the selection rate of less than 2.5 percent.<sup>27</sup> The active component sends its best and brightest Majors to recruiting duty as RS Commanding Officers.

AR enlisted assignments to PSR duty are governed in accordance with the special duty screening process, which is similar to the active component, special duty screening

process.<sup>28</sup> A qualified Sergeant, Staff Sergeant or Gunnery Sergeant, upon being identified and qualified through the screening process, will attend the Prior Service, Basic Recruiter's Course. Upon graduation, a new PSR recruiter reports to one of the six PSRSs for duty. Generally upon completion of a tour of PSR duty, a successful recruiter will then return to a tour of duty in his or her primary MOS, although the opportunity to transition as a Career Recruiter exists. For a PSR recruiter to become a Career Recruiter (MOS 8412), he or she must be a Gunnery Sergeant or Staff Sergeant selected for Gunnery Sergeant; successfully complete two years of duty in a Canvassing Recruiter (8411) billet; have consistently attained quality and quantity of the recruiting mission and generally be assessed by the Officer-in-Charge as having the ability to effectively influence and lead in the recruiting environment.<sup>29</sup> In addition, Career Recruiters attend the Career Recruiter Course, also located at MCRCs Recruiter's School in San Diego, California.<sup>30</sup> Career Recruiters are subject to normal permanent change of station moves within the AR PSR structure. These Marines are expected to serve in progressively challenging Career Recruiter billets, as they professionally grow in rank and experience.<sup>31</sup>

### Scope

This study is designed to evaluate the efficacy of the Marine Corps' decision to integrate PSR into MCRC, after years of successful PSR execution existing within the Marine Forces Reserve. The targeted populations of Marines and civilians to be surveyed represent those personnel whose primary duties impact the leadership and execution within the Marine Corps' total force recruiting construct, as well as whose primary duties impact the manning and training of MCR units. Additionally, all current AR officers will

be solicited to participate, as these Marines represent the cadre of officers who serve on active duty, principally in support of the MCR. The study focuses on the period beginning in FY04, through the end of FY12.

### Limitations

This study will not have access to the opinions of any personnel who served in the supported or supporting commands, when PSR existed within the Marine Forces Reserve. Only the opinions of personnel who are currently serving within the supported or supporting commands, or as officers within the AR program, will be evaluated through the survey instrument. If any member of the four targeted populations previously served in a capacity supported by or in support of PSR or total force recruiting prior to October 2003, it will be by coincidence only that such a respondent is recruited to participate in the survey instrument.

### Delimitations

This study is specifically focused on the task organization and leadership of the PSR construct within MCRC, since the Marine Corps integrated all recruiting activities into MCRC, beginning fully in FY04. Excluded from the study are any fiscal considerations, as well as any specific examination of reserve unit operational readiness prior to or after PSRs integration into MCRC.

### Primary Research Question

Is the current model for partially populating the MCR through PSR ideally commanded and controlled by MCRC, while simultaneously providing career enhancing opportunities for the AR Marines who successfully perform on PSR duty?

### Secondary Research Questions

Secondary and further sub-questions must be developed and addressed. The secondary questions consist of the following: (1) Is MCRC reliant upon the PSR force in order to accomplish the Marine Corps' annual reserve NPS accession mission? (2) Does the current task organization of PSR within MCRC provide conditions for fairness and equitability among all assigned recruiting personnel? (3) Are AR Marines inspired to serve on PSR duty in its current construct? (4) Can the USMC RC absorb the manpower sourcing requirements for a PSR force as a stand-alone command? (5) Are the supported commands supportive of a shift in the command and control of PSR under the Director, Reserve Affairs?

### U.S. Army Reserve Prior Service Recruiting: An Alternative

As a matter of comparison of MCRC and its command and control over the whole of Marine Corps' recruiting, it is important to observe the mission, task organization and leadership of the United States Army Reserve's recruiting construct, and how it nests within the overall Army recruiting practice. The United States Army equivalent to MCRC is the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). USAREC is comprised of a recruiting headquarters, six subordinate recruiting brigades, each of which has either seven or eight subordinate recruiting battalions, totaling 44 recruiting battalions, in support of its NPS mission.<sup>32</sup> USAREC does not execute the U.S. Army Reserve's (USAR) PSR mission.<sup>33</sup> The recruiting and retention mission for the USAR is conducted under the command of the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR), who exercises command and control of the reserve recruiting and retention mission through his Deputy Commanding General for Support, U.S. Army Reserve Command, who commands and

controls the Commander, Army Reserve Careers Division (ARCD).<sup>34</sup> The Commander of ARCD is an Active Guard Reserve (AGR) officer.<sup>35</sup> The AGR program is the USAR version of the Marine Corps' AR program. All active duty personnel assigned to the ARCD in the headquarters or subordinate battalions are AGR personnel.<sup>36</sup> There are 13 battalion headquarters which are task organized in support of the ARCD recruiting and retention mission<sup>37</sup> Each of the battalion headquarters is independent from USAREC locations. Figure 4 depicts the Army Reserve Career Division's subordinate battalion lay down across the country.




Figure 4. Army Reserve Careers Division, Subordinate Battalion Lay down

Source: ARCD mission update brief from 18 July 2012, electronic correspondence with author.

## Chapter Summary

The future of the command and control of the Marine Corps' reserve PSR mission, personnel and equipment is a viable topic for study. Understanding the contemporary history of the role of the MCR within the operational reserve construct and its contribution to our nation's conflicts through unit and individual mobilizations brings credibility to the requirement in having a robust PSR entity. Understanding the Marine Corps AR program, the existing PSR personnel structure and task organization, along with the alternative example of the USARs recruiting and retention construct, leads to the primary research question. Upon the execution of mixed research methodology through the conduct of a survey instrument and document reviews, the ground truth among the personnel intimately involved in the leadership and execution of the duty will provide the preponderance of the evidence demonstrating the foundation for the best way forward in the execution of the MCRs PSR effort.

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<sup>1</sup>U.S.C. Title 10, Subtitle C, Part I, Chapter 506, § 5042 Headquarters Marine Corps; General Duties.

<sup>2</sup>Daniel Choike and Mike Zeliff, "Marine Corps Recruiting Command and RAND Study Group," June 2008, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/conference/rand/ChoikeZeliffPresentation.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2012).

<sup>3</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1130.76B, *Conduct of Recruiting Operations* (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2008), 1.

<sup>4</sup>United States Marine Corps, Correspondence between CG, MCRC and his subordinate commanders, over "Warning Order and Command Shift with Integration of PSR within MCRC," FY04 Reorganization Matrix, 2 June 2003. Provided to author by the MCRC G-3 PSR, from historical files, 1 March 2013.

<sup>5</sup>Choike and Zeliff.

<sup>6</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1001.52J, *Active Reserve Support to the United States Marine Corps Reserve* (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2011), 3-8.

<sup>7</sup>United States Marine Corps, “PSR Mission Statement,” Recruiter’s School, <https://www.marines.usmc.mil/RS/pages/brc/psr.html> (accessed 1 December 2012).

<sup>8</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Marine Recruiters Succeed in FY12,” <http://www.mcrc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/5320/Article/134440/marine-recruiters-succeed-in-fy12.aspx> (accessed 1 December 2012).

<sup>9</sup>United States Marine Corps, Correspondence between the Head, Recruiting Division (MCRSC) and the Commanding General, MCRSC, “Concerns with Merging Recruiting Forces,” 27 February 1996. Provided to author by the MCRC G-3 PSR historical files, 1 March 2013.

<sup>10</sup>Stephen Duncan, *Citizen Warriors: America’s National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 131.

<sup>11</sup>Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component, Volume I, Executive Summary and Main Report* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2011), 16.

<sup>12</sup>David Edson, “An Operational Reserve: Examining Roles, Missions and Critical Assumptions” (Master’s Thesis, Marine Corps War College, 2012), 2.

<sup>13</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Commander, Marine Forces Reserve Vision and Strategy, 2012-2017* (New Orleans, LA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve, 2012), 4.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>15</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Reshaping America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness: Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group* (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2011), 2.

<sup>16</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Commander, Marine Forces Reserve*, 11.

<sup>17</sup>U.S.C. Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, § 12310 Reserves; For Organizing, Administering for Reserve Components.

<sup>18</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1001.52J, 2.

<sup>19</sup>Department of Defense, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2013*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/mil.pdf> (accessed 2 January 2013).

<sup>20</sup>Joseph Garcia, “Total Force Integration: Transforming the United States Marine Corps From Good to Great” (Master’s Thesis, Marine Corps War College, 2007), 4.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>22</sup>United States Marine Corps, Active Reserve Authorized Strength Report (ASR) August 2012, electronic correspondence with author, 28 November 2012.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>United States Marine Corps, “PSR Mission Statement.”

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>United States Marine Corps, MARADMIN 486/12, 30 August 2012, <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/110382/fy13-recruiting-station-commanding-officer-rsco-selections.aspx> (accessed 3 December 2012).

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO P1326.6D, *Selecting, Screening and Preparing Enlisted Marines for Special Duty Assignments and Independent Duties*, (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2011), 2.

<sup>29</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1100R.78A, 1-2.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>32</sup>United States Army Recruiting Command, “Recruiting Update” (PowerPoint presentation, 20 August 2012).

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>United States Army Reserve, “Shaping and Sustaining Army Reserve Strength” (PowerPoint presentation, 20 August 2012).

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

In the existing body of knowledge, published work over the topic of the responsibility for Marine Corps Reserve's (MCR) Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) construct since it was integrated into the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) in 2003, is non-existent. Prior to integration of PSR into the MCRC command and control structure, there were several major and minor studies conducted over the potential for integrating all Marine Corps recruiting activities under a single, total force recruiting construct. The last study executed over the role of a total force Marine Corps recruiting construct was conducted in late 1998. This thesis is the first exploratory study over the Marine Corps's current task organization and leadership responsibility over the execution of its reserve PSR activity since the Marine Corps integrated all recruiting activity under the total force recruiting model within MCRC, since the beginning of FY04.

Although the literature review lacks the breadth of topical consideration of work covering the current task organization or leadership of the PSR mission, it includes the review of some specific work which discusses several contributing factors impacting the study. Among these factors is the role of the MCR in the broader spectrum of the operational reserve. The *Commander, Marine Forces Reserve Vision and Strategy, 2012-2017*, represents how the Marine Corps presently views its own reserve forces' nesting into the larger defense strategy, and the operational reserve. Included in this document is the issue of reserve personnel recruitment and its strategic role in ensuring ready units for inclusion into the operational reserve construct. Additionally, a Marine Corps War

College master's thesis discusses the role of the operational reserve within the larger U.S. defense strategy.

The next contributing area is comprised of two examples of prior studies executed over the efficacy of reserve PSR, executed outside of MCRC. The first piece of literature is a Naval Audit Service study conducted in 1994. It covers the Marine Corps' execution of recruiting from two separate recruiting entities, in the form Non-Prior Service (NPS) recruiting conducted by MCRC and reserve PSR conducted by the former Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (MCRSC). The second study is the 1998, jointly-chartered MCRC and Marine Forces Reserve study, which specifically examined reserve unit readiness as the measure of the MCRs success in conducting PSR external from the MCRC. The Commandant of the Marine Corps' (CMC) response to the Naval Audit Service study, as well as MCRSCs response and recommended courses of action, will also be reviewed. The final literature to be reviewed in this particular section is the 2001 Marine Oversight Requirements Council (MROC) direction to CG, MCRC to establish a feasible means of integrating total force recruiting, assisting in the foundation for how the Marine Corps arrived at the point of integrating PSR into the MCRC.

The next contributing area is comprised of several policy documents pertinent to the MCRs Active Reserve (AR) program, as well as policy impacting the assignment and training of PSR personnel. The AR program is well outlined in a Marine Corps War College master's thesis, as well as in a comprehensive Marine Corps Order written by the Reserve Affairs Division at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Additional literature are two more Marine Corps Orders discussing the assignment of reserve PSR recruiters to the

Career Recruiter MOS, as well as the USMC recruiting and retention training and readiness manual.

Another contributing area of scholarship is over the issue of leadership on recruiting duty. A Naval Postgraduate School master's thesis written over the topic of the selection process for USMC RS Commanding Officers, as well as an article outlining the USMC Recruiting Station leadership and decision-making environment from the perspective of the RS Commanding Officer, provide a basis within this area in the body of scholarship.

### The Operational Reserve

The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (CMFR) published his overarching view of the MCRs contribution to the operational reserve within the larger national defense strategy, in his *Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, Vision and Strategy, 2012-2017*. This CMFR guidance document was published at the apex of Marine Corps' recent forces structure changes, in which significant numbers of reserve units are being geographically shifted around the country, which causes substantial recruitment issues in both the NPS and PS markets. The document possesses depth as to the foundations of the MCRs role as an operational reserve, and how Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) will continue to set conditions for robust contribution, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment. Specifically, CMFR assessed that "the reserve component must remain a ready-responsive-relevant force capable of seamlessly operating as a part of the total force."<sup>1</sup> Among several initiatives contained within his guidance document, CMFR sets condition for honoring the continued manning, training and equipping of the MFR and its subordinate units, through five strategic goals.<sup>2</sup> Of significance is CMFRs strategic goal

number five; “Identify and implement a future force laydown that maximizes integration with total force capabilities balanced with fiscal limitations, personnel recruitment, training opportunities, and facility considerations.”<sup>3</sup> Clearly, CMFR sees the future MCR ability to operationally contribute to the broader defense strategy, as requiring focused personnel recruitment practices as a strategic priority, which will enable operational unit readiness.

Apart from CMFRs guidance document, in his 2012 Marine Corps War College master’s thesis, “An Operational Reserve: Examining Roles, Missions and Critical Assumptions,” Marine Lieutenant Colonel David Edson wrote about the nature of how the whole of the nation’s reserve components have essentially shifted from the former strategic reserve construct, to that of an operational reserve. In emphasizing his point about how the reserve component has become an easily accessible body of military capabilities, Edson organized his work around the strategic operating environment, reserve roles and missions, equipment and access.<sup>4</sup> The nature of the United States’ involvement in major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 12 years necessitated the use of the reserves. Edson argues that because of the national military strategy over the last decade and that of the foreseeable future, the reserve component “will continue to reduce the gap between strategy and active component force structure.”<sup>5</sup> Whether the use of the reserves has been deployed in support of combat objectives, or mobilized at home in support of homeland defense missions, the reserve component has been operationally employed. While Edson’s thesis does not explore the impact of recruiting on the maintenance of a healthy, operational reserve force, Edson indirectly demonstrates that the reserve components across the services require persistent strength

in acquiring requisite personnel. The underlying theme is that capable individuals and functioning units add depth to the reality of the operational reserve construct.

#### Past Studies and the Marine Corps' Response: A Timeline

In 1994, not long after the Marine Corps stood up MCRC, the Department of the Navy's Naval Audit Service, conducted a study into the management of the Marine Corps recruiting functions. In the Audit Report dated 16 November 1994, the authors of the report concluded that the CMC should "initiate action to consolidate prior service with non-prior service recruiting functions."<sup>6</sup> The study's conclusions depicted that the separation of NPS recruiting and PSR necessitated the maintenance of 48 excess billets within the larger recruiting construct.<sup>7</sup> Upon its ability to respond to the 1994 study results, the Marine Corps' response on 10 February 1995, held the position that the execution of reserve PSR, was appropriately managed by the MCR, separate from MCRC. Specifically, the CMC stated that "the audit failed to consider the uniqueness of PSR with regard to limitations imposed by geography and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) demographics."<sup>8</sup> The Marine Corps' position on how it executed its total force recruiting firmly separated reserve PSR from the overall MCRC construct, predicated on the fact that the two types of recruiting were different from one another, and required the distinct skills and management of the different organizations.

By February 1996, the Head, Recruiting Division within MCRSC, wrote internal correspondence to CG, MCRSC, relative to the on-going discussions about merging reserve PSR into the greater MCRC construct. At that time, the recent results of the 1994 Naval Audit Service study and the CMCs response to it, generated further discussion internal to the MCR, over its future in executing the reserve PSR mission. The senior,

MCR AR officer who had staff cognizance over the reserve PSR mission, made it clear to his CG that the MCR had been successful for 13 consecutive years at that point, while executing a distinctly different and demanding mission apart from that of MCRC in the non-prior service realm.<sup>9</sup>

Transitioning from the Naval Audit Service study from 1994 and further internal MCRSC discussion in 1996, a joint MCRC and MFR study was chartered and executed from August to November 1998. The study was titled: “Marine Corps Prior Service Recruiting: Is it Time for a Change?” The authors, Colonels O. J. Milano and D. R. Selvage, were experienced Marine Corps District Commanding Officers. Colonel Selvage was the Chief of Staff, MFR, so ostensibly brought both MCRCs and MFRs unique perspectives to the study. The principal purpose behind their study was to determine validity in the maintenance of two separate recruiting organizations, from the perspective of PSR contributing to the fulfillment of unit readiness levels.<sup>10</sup> The authors argued that mission success for PSR must be re-defined to incorporate not simple, numeric attainment, but also highlighted the importance of PSR attainment including the required level of MOS matches, which ultimately impacts unit readiness.<sup>11</sup> Although the study ultimately concluded that PSR as an organization would have to improve in its sales ability, and was fully capable of continued success in executing its mission independent from MCRC, the authors recommended integration of PSR into MCRC.<sup>12</sup>

As a matter of MFRs continuity into the on-going study process after November 1998, a PSR consolidated working group was convened to collectively address the results of 1998 study. The role of this working group was to provide varying courses of action to CMFR, in his continued dialogue with CG, MCRC, and senior Marine Corps leadership

as a whole, relative to the future of PSR and its contribution to unit readiness levels. The working group specifically developed three distinct courses of action regarding the future disposition of PSR: (1) Maintain the status quo, (2) Build a 7th Marine Corps District internal to MCRC, specifically designed to execute PSR, and (3) Execute partial integration under MCRC.<sup>13</sup> The preferred course of action was number two, which would enable a specific command structure within MCRC, for the purpose of executing PSRs mission.<sup>14</sup>

Over two years passed between the publishing of the results of the internal Marine Corps study and the MROC direction to CG, MCRC, to determine the feasibility of integrating PSR into MCRC, in February 2001. In the documented results of the 23 February 2001 MROC meeting, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) tasked CG, MCRC, to “present a decision brief to the MROC recommending whether reserve recruiting should, or should not, move from MCRSC to MCRC,” which was ultimately decided in April 2001<sup>15</sup>

In response to the MROC direction to CG, MCRC, the CG, MCRSC, generated an internal point paper outlining advantages and disadvantages of integrating PSR into MCRC, on 1 March 2001. A salient effort was made by CG, MCRSC, to recommend the best course of action for MCRC to take in integrating PSR under the command and control of the MCRC. Specifically, CG, MCRSC sought for MCRC to create the 7th district, accommodating a command structure staffed by MCR AR personnel, designed to retain substantive MCR influence in the leadership of PSRs mission and personnel.<sup>16</sup> CG, MCRSCs position echoed that which was synthesized in the working group which developed courses of action resulting from the 1998 study.

### Marine Corps Reserve's AR Program and other Pertinent Policies

In his 2008 Marine Corps War College master's thesis, "Total Force Integration: Transforming the United States Marine Corps From Good to Great," Marine Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Garcia presents a salient, informed argument as to the nature of the AR program's role in integrating the total force construct. He describes the scope of how "the 2006 National Military Strategy (NMS) acknowledged that the enhancement of joint war fighting and achievement of its strategic objectives required the integration of the active and RC to create a seamless total force that can meet future needs."<sup>17</sup> Tying in the total force partnership that exists through the authority emanating from U.S.C. Title 10, Garcia elaborates on the selected reserve force's "reserves on full-time active duty support of the reserves," as being the active duty entity which is distinctly different from ordinary, mobilized reservists.<sup>18</sup> During the last 12 years at war in which many reserve units and individual personnel have been mobilized in support of national objectives, the role of the AR program has been muddled as AR Marines have not adhered to their disciplined role within the Title 10 construct. To the uninformed, an AR Marine is an activated reservist on some type of short-term, active duty orders, in support of whatever unit's mission with which he or she is associated. Garcia goes to great lengths to demonstrate the flaw in this type of thinking, particularly among active component personnel from commands who employ AR Marines assigned in support of total force integration objectives.

Concurrently, many AR Marines do not fully understand their role as total force integrators, particularly when assigned to structured AR billets within an active component, operating force headquarters. Garcia relates the inherent responsibilities of individual AR Marines and the AR program as a whole, through the application of the

tenets of U.S.C. Title 10, in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing and training the RC.

Apart from Lieutenant Colonel Garcia's master's thesis which in part highlighted contemporary misunderstandings in the appropriate employment of AR Marines, a coherent policy exists which governs the role of the MCR AR program. Marine Corps Order 1001.52J, *Active Reserve Support to the United States Marine Corps Reserve*, last revised in June of 2011, defines the role of the AR program. The order is properly seated in all applicable laws and higher headquarters' policy directives. It is considered the undisputed source of policy relating to how the AR program exists, why it exists, and how individual AR Marines are recruited, managed, cultivated, and assigned in their respective careers. Equally important in this Marine Corps Order is how it defines AR enlisted Marines' assignment to PSR duty. The order is one of few documents that delineate the nature of PSR duty in terms of the special duty assignment that it is. Specifically, PSR duty is considered part of the preferred enlisted progression path within the enlisted career path pyramid.<sup>19</sup> Although this order defines enlisted PSR service as special duty, it does not delineate officers serving on PSR duty as fulfilling any special type of duty, or requiring any particular selection or special skills or abilities to qualify to serve within it. The order has an appendix depicting officer career paths, though only cursorily demonstrates the point in an officer's career where he or she may serve on PSR duty.

Among a few additional Marine Corps Orders which serve as policy guidance over the foundations of PSR is MCO 1100R.78A, the *Active Reserve Career Recruiter Program*, dated 7 August 2008. This document is one of only a few examples which

highlight the importance in the leadership of the PSR effort. Career Recruiters, whether serving within the NPS or PSR construct, are considered the backbone of recruiting, predicated on the fact that they made a decision to accept the path to earn the 8412 MOS, and have committed to serve only on recruiting duty.<sup>20</sup> This cadre of personnel possesses critical knowledge over the recruiting process, and serves in the advisor role to commanders and officer-in-charge, as well as serving as mentors and trainers for subordinate leaders and canvassing recruiters. The PSR career recruiter MOS path was established in 1995 in order to establish stability and continuity within PSR operations, mirrored with MCRCs career recruiter concept.<sup>21</sup> The order signifies the importance of properly cultivating and managing the PSR career recruiter force. Of the existing AR enlisted structure coded for support of PSR manning requirements, it is clear that PSR supporters within the current MCRC construct view the PSR career recruiter structure in high regard, as the order clearly delineates the billet types and locations where PSR career recruiters are warranted.

In addition to MCO 1100R.78A, another order exists in the body of knowledge which demonstrates the importance of PSR as a part of the overall systematic recruiting platform from which the whole of MCRC operates. NAVMC 3500.71B, the *Recruiting and Retention Readiness Manual*, dated 30 January 2012, serves as the recently published authoritative guidance and direction over the training process in the practice of recruiting and retention. Specifically, the order delineates the training and evaluation process for all recruiting personnel, to include PSR personnel. This order demonstrates the significant value of PSR operations, with respect to the total force recruiting construct through the detailed codification of the PSR training and readiness individual events in chapter 8.<sup>22</sup>

The contents of this training and readiness manual are the result of tested standards, for which the periodic update of the manual sets better conditions for the future of recruiting and retention practices in the Marine Corps.

### Criticality of Leadership on Recruiting Duty

In his 2005 Naval Postgraduate School master's thesis, "Analysis of the Screening and Selection Process for U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station Commanding Officers," Marine Captain Manuel Munoz elaborates on the purpose behind the selection process for Marine Majors to serve in the very demanding, leadership intensive duty. Duty as a Recruiting Station Commanding Officer (RSCO) requires the Majors to be of the highest caliber, as exemplified through a measure of previous experience in command or substantive leadership positions.<sup>23</sup> Munoz' study describes the characteristics of a successful RSCO, as well the history behind the establishment of the selection process. Dating back to 1996, MCRC and senior Marine Corps manpower management officials designed and implemented the selection process which remains intact today.<sup>24</sup> Evident throughout the thesis, Marine Corps recruiting duty requires that the leaders must consistently exercise sound leadership and judgment practices, as well as an insatiable desire to succeed in the unique, independent operating environment. In terms of the PSR effort, although the current assignment process for Officers-in-Charge does not incorporate any specific selection process for officers serving on the duty, Munoz emphasizes the view of then CG of MCRC, MajGen Klimp, in denoting the fact that Marine recruiters deserve the best officers that the Marine Corps can offer, in positions of recruiting leadership.<sup>25</sup> For the last 16 years, the Marine Corps has screened and assigned the best available Majors to duty as RSCOs, as a result of formulating and executing a

process to identify proven performers who appear able to successfully negotiate the rigors of recruiting duty.

While Munoz' thesis discussed the importance behind the screening and selection process for RSCOs, a successful former RSCO, Major David Hudspeth, wrote an article titled "Recruiting Duty: Thoughts for the RS Commander," published in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, March of 2008. Hudspeth's principal theme centers on the ability of the RSCO to selflessly engage and empower all assigned personnel, in order to achieve assigned missions. His work depicts the necessity for the RSCO to build a cohesive command group, capable of energetically interacting with the RSs subordinate leaders. Hudspeth highlights that the formulation of the annual recruiting plan in preparation for the coming fiscal year's mission requires the input and buy-in of the entire command group and substation Non-Commissioned Officers-in-Charge, in order to most effectively inspire ownership in the mission.<sup>26</sup> The aim of his work is an attempt to influence an audience of Majors recently selected for the duty, as well as existing RSCOs within their first year, with some tested techniques in developing and executing equitable practices in applying mission parameters and holding subordinates accountable well ahead of the actual recruiting campaign which begins each year on 1 October. While this article is germane to Marine Corps NPS recruiting, the message within the article is applicable within the total force recruiting construct, to include PSR: leadership on recruiting duty requires resourcefulness, flexibility and an unrestricted willingness to share successful practices across the recruiting force.<sup>27</sup>

### Chapter Summary

This study represents original contribution to the overall body of scholarship, as it is the first study of its kind exploring the decision to incorporate PSR into a broader total force recruiting construct within MCRC. There are several pieces of literature which collectively depict different value points impacting the study into the current model of MCRCs command and control of the PSR. The MCRs ability to nest within the greater operational reserve construct is wholesomely depicted in the CMFR guidance document, as well as a Marine Corps War College master's thesis. With respect to the review of the historical timeline capturing the initiation of previous studies, as well as the different responses to those studies and discussions, a wealth of information exists, principally in the form of the studies themselves and the official CMC responses, along with several subordinate command internal point papers. With regards to active duty structure supporting the PSR activity, several Marine Corps Orders, as well as another Marine Corps War College master's thesis exists, in support of MCR policy over the AR program, as well as other policies enabling the growth and assignment of enlisted leaders within the extant PSR construct. The body of knowledge regarding leadership on recruiting duty exists in a Naval Post Graduate School thesis and a *Marine Corps Gazette* article written by a former Recruiting Station Commanding Officer. Overall, within the literature reviewed, several of the contributing ideas will augment the analysis conducted in chapter 4, which in part will include the impetus behind the need for a robust reserve PSR effort, the assignment of AR personnel in support of PSR in its role of manning the MCR, as well as the screening and selection of the best officers to serve on recruiting duty.

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<sup>1</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Commander, Marine Forces Reserve Vision and Strategy, 2012-2017* (New Orleans, LA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve, 2012), ii.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 22.

<sup>4</sup>David Edson, “An Operational Reserve: Examining Roles, Missions and Critical Assumptions” (Master’s Thesis, Marine Corps War College, 2012), i.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>6</sup>Naval Audit Service, “Audit Report” (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 7 March 1995), 1.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Naval Audit Service Draft Audit Report on Management of Marine Corps Recruiting Functions (94-0009)” (Arlington, VA: Department of the Navy, 10 February 1995).

<sup>9</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Concerns with Merging Recruiting Forces.”

<sup>10</sup>O. J. Milano and D. R. Selvage, “Marine Corps Prior Service Recruiting: Is it Time for a Change?” (Internal USMC Study on the Issue of Total Force Recruiting, 13 November 1998), 1.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>13</sup>United States Marine Corps. Consolidated working group papers, 1998-2000. Provided to author from historical files in the MCRC G-3 PSR, 1 March 2013.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>United States Marine Corps, “MROC Decision Memorandum 12-2001” (Arlington, VA.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, February 2001).

<sup>16</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Reserve Support Command Point Paper,” 1 March 2001. Provided to author from historical files in the MCRC G-3 PSR, 1 March 2013.

<sup>17</sup>Joseph Garcia, “Total Force Integration: Transforming the United States Marine Corps From Good to Great” (Master’s Thesis, Marine Corps War College, 2007), 1.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., iii.

<sup>19</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1001.52J, *Active Reserve Support to the United States Marine Corps Reserve* (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2011), 3-8.

<sup>20</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1100R.78A, *Active Reserve Career Recruiter Program* (Arlington, VA.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, August 2007), 2.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 8-2.

<sup>23</sup>Manuel Munoz, “Analysis for the Screening and Selection Process for U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station Commanding Officers” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2005), 1.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>David Hudspeth, “Recruiting Duty: Thoughts for the RS Commander,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 92, no. 3 (March 2008): 40.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 43.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

Research into the model by which the Marine Corps executes its reserve Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) mission is an original, exploratory study which evaluates the current construct of nesting PSR within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC). The goal in the research is to produce evidence to answer the primary research question. The research will ultimately support or disprove the researcher's hypothesis that the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) PSR mission should be operationally shifted outside of MCRC and task organized as a specific subordinate command under the control of the Director, Reserve Affairs (RA) Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC). In order to address the question of whether the current model for partially populating the MCR through PSR is ideally commanded and controlled by MCRC, while simultaneously providing career enhancing opportunities for the Active Reserve (AR) Marines who successfully perform on PSR duty, there are five secondary questions to be answered through the application of mixed research methodologies. The two methodologies to be employed are the use of opinion surveys and document reviews. The researcher will conduct surveys in accordance with Department of Defense and social science human subject research standards, as well as in accordance with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Graduate Degree Programs' Quality Assurance Office (QAO) controls. These controls require strict adherence to protocols in conducting human subject research. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, as an U.S. Army Institutional Review Board mechanism,

retains appropriate Department of Defense assurance for the conduct of reviewing and approving research design and methodology. The Graduate Degree Programs' QAO necessitates that a human subject protective agent be utilized to actually conduct the electronic transmission of the surveys, along with the generation of the data resulting from the surveys. The system to be used is the Inquisite Survey System, provided by the Allegiance Company. The manner in which the survey questions are formulated necessitates that the respondent indicates his or her strong agreement, agreement, neutrality, disagreement or strong disagreement. Additionally, the respondents will have an opportunity to provide qualitative responses supporting their agreement or disagreement, where supplemental questions are asked. Overall, the process by which the surveys will be established and executed provides necessary safeguards for the participants and the researcher to be free from any harm in the process.

There are four distinct groupings of Marines to be surveyed. Their opinions over the matter within the research design will aid in answering the primary research question, as well as contributing to the substantiation of qualitative conclusions from the research itself. The first grouping is a sub-set of the current slate of unit Inspector-Instructors (I&Is), reserve unit commanders and the unit senior enlisted advisors at the company or battery level and above, from across the Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) within Marine Forces Reserve (MFR). The I&Is and reserve unit commanders, where both exist, jointly share the command responsibility of their respective units, which includes the responsibility for ensuring the evaluation and decision on the affiliation of a prior service (PS) Marine recruited by PSR, to fill a vacant billet. The second grouping is the current population of all company grade and field grade AR Officers, whose experience and

opinion over the role, construct and malleability of the AR program is necessary in uncovering evidence to partially answer the research questions. In addition, a percentage of the current slate of AR officers is presently serving on PSR duty, or has served on PSR duty, thus have unique perspective in the goal of the research. The third grouping is comprised of the officers, career recruiters and civilians assigned in recruiting leadership and management positions at the Marine Corps District (MCD), Recruiting Region G-3 Operations staffs and the MCRC G-3 Operations staff. These personnel individually possess abundant recruiting duty experience from which to draw out similarities and differences among PSR and non-prior service (NPS) recruiting missions, as well as other qualitative views on the PSR officer assignment process. The fourth and last grouping to be surveyed is the population of AR Marines currently assigned to PSR duty. The AR Marines who conduct the PSR mission individually and collectively possess a great source of evidence relative to the motivation to perform the duty within MCRC, as well as the perception of fairness in the personnel evaluation system, to which they are individually subjected.

The secondary questions consist of the following: (1) Is MCRC reliant upon the PSR force in order to accomplish the Marine Corps' annual reserve NPS accession mission? (2) Does the current task organization of PSR within MCRC provide conditions for fairness and equitability among all assigned recruiting personnel? (3) Are AR Marines inspired to serve on PSR duty in its current construct? (4) Can the USMC RC absorb the manpower sourcing requirements for a PSR force as a stand-alone command? (5) Are the supported commands supportive of a shift in the command and control of PSR under the Director, Reserve Affairs? Each of the secondary research questions will be supported by

formulating additional sub-questions and supplemental questions. The remainder of this chapter will include each secondary question as its own subheading, with a discussion over the research methodology to be used, any sub-questions and supplemental questions, as well as by identifying from what sources evidence will answer the sub-questions or secondary questions, directly.

**Is MCRC Reliant upon the PSR force in Order to Accomplish the Marine Corps' Annual Reserve NPS Accession Mission?**

In order to answer this secondary question, both methods of research will be used to reveal evidence directly answering the question, as well as through revealing evidence by analyzing documentary information in two areas, as well as by one sub-question by survey of the District Command Groups, Recruiting Region and MCRC G-3 staffs. Evidence directly supporting answering the secondary question rests in the recruiting data representing MCRCs NPS reserve recruiting annual mission and mission results from FY 2006 through FY 2012, as well as the PSR mission and mission results over the same time period.

The first area to be analyzed by documentary evidence is whether MCRC was originally designed to command and control all forms of recruiting. This evidence is in a Naval Post Graduate School master's thesis titled "Analysis for the Screening and Selection Process for U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station Commanding Officers," written in 2005, as well as in an analysis of the 2001 Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) decision to incorporate PSR under MCRC. Another area for analysis is what the systematic methods of NPS recruiting are, versus the systematic methods of reserve PSR. This evidence is located in the Marine Corps recruiting volumes

that govern the conduct of recruiting and will demonstrate similarities and differences in how MCRC elements recruit in both NPS and PS recruiting markets.

The sub-question by survey of the District Command Groups, Recruiting Region and MCRC G-3 staffs is “PSRs influence in the districts’ NPS reserve recruiting mission is required for the District to accomplish its NPS, reserve recruiting mission?”; supplemented by “you indicated that PSRs influence in the districts’ NPS reserve recruiting mission is or is not required for the District to accomplish its reserve recruiting mission.” Please explain.

Does the Current Task Organization of PSR within MCRC Provide Conditions for Fairness and Equitability among all Assigned Recruiting Personnel?

In order to answer this secondary question, survey instrumentation will be used to reveal evidence through one sub-question by survey of all District level PSR personnel and five sub-questions by survey of the District Command Groups, Recruiting Region and MCRC G-3 Operations staffs. The sub-questions will be supported by supplemental questions to elicit qualitative responses.

The first sub-question by survey of all District level PSR Marines is “PSR personnel are evaluated fairly?”; supplemented by “you indicated that PSR personnel are or are not evaluated fairly. Please explain.”

The second sub-question by survey of District Command Groups, Recruiting Region and MCRC G-3 Operations staffs is “NPS and PS recruiting missions are similar missions?”; supplemented by “you indicated that NPS and PS recruiting missions are or are not similar missions. Please explain.” The third sub-question is “RSCOs have a more difficult recruiting mission than PSR OICs?”; supplemented by “you indicated that

RSCOs do or do not have a more difficult recruiting mission than PSR OICs. Please explain.” The fourth sub-question is “PSR OICs should be board selected, similar to RSCOs?” The fifth sub-question is “PSR career recruiter SNCOICs perform the same mission as NPS Career Recruiter SNCOICs?”; supplemented by “you indicated that PSR career recruiter SNCOICs do or do not perform the same mission as NPS career recruiter SNCOICs. Please explain.” The final sub-question is “PSR recruiters (8411s) conduct the same mission as NPS recruiters (8411s)?”; supplemented by “you indicated that PSR recruiters (8411s) conduct the same mission as NPS recruiters (8411s). Please explain.”

**Are AR Marines Inspired to serve on PSR duty in its Current Construct?**

In order to answer the secondary question, the research methodology used is by survey of all AR officers through four sub-questions, and by survey of all District level PSR personnel through two sub-questions, with some additional, supplemental questions. Of all AR officers, the first sub-question is “the establishment of a formal PSR OIC selection board would attract more AR officers to serve on PSR duty?” A second sub-question is “having PSR billets under the command and control of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command positively affects my desire to serve on PSR duty?”; supplemented by “you indicated that having PSR billets under the command and control of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command positively affects or does not positively affect your desire to serve on PSR duty. Please explain.” A third sub-question is the “placement of PSR billets under the command and control of a different Marine Corps agency (other than MCRC) would positively affect my desire to serve on PSR duty?”; supplemented by “you indicated that placement of PSR billets under the command and control of a different

Marine Corps agency (other than MCRC) would positively affect or would not positively affect your desire to serve on PSR duty. Please explain.

The first sub-question of District level PSR personnel is “a PSR tour of duty within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command was one of your top three choices for duty assignment?” The second sub-question is “serving on PSR duty within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command provides incentives for you to earn recognition through exceptional performance?”; supplemented by “you indicated that serving on PSR duty within MCRC provides or does not provide incentives for you to earn through exceptional performance. Please explain.”

Can the USMC RC Absorb the Manpower Sourcing Requirements for a PSR force as a stand-alone Command?

In order to answer this secondary question, both methods of research will be used to glean evidence by documentary review and one sub-question by survey of AR officers. The documentary review will provide evidence as to how the Director, RA can task organize a PSR command under the control of RA. U.S.C. Title 10 demonstrates the Marine Corps’ and specifically the MCRs responsibility for the conduct of recruiting the reserve force. Additionally, a comparison of the U.S. Army Reserve Careers Division establishment in its reserve PSR and retention construct, will demonstrate how the Army Reserve task organizes and executes the same reserve PSR mission on behalf of its reserve component. Another area for review is how a viable PSR command is structured. Analysis of a MCDs headquarters’ table of organization will demonstrate what a comparable PSR command element should consist of in terms of personnel structure, in order to function as a stand-alone command. The next area to be reviewed is the ability of

the existing AR personnel structure to support the creation of a stand-alone PSR command. Analysis of the current AR structure provided by RAM will determine whether or not it can accommodate standing up a PSR command headquarters. Another area to be analyzed is what the process is for enacting AR personnel, internal structure changes. Evidence which will contribute to answering the sub-question exists in a host of historical, unpublished internal point papers, Marine Administrative Messages denoting the convening of AR structure review processes, as well as an analysis over the Marine Corps' Combat Development Command's Total Force Structure Division, Table of Organization and Equipment Change Request (TOECR) process.

The sub-question by survey of all AR officers is “assigning a command-screened, AR Colonel to command and control the PSR force creates greater career opportunity for me as an AR officer?”; supplemented by “you indicated that assigning a command screened AR Colonel to command and control the PSR force creates greater career opportunity for me as an AR officer. Please explain.”

Are the Supported Commands Supportive of a Shift in the Command and Control of PSR under the Director, Reserve Affairs?

In order to answer this secondary research question, the survey instrument will be employed to reveal evidence from five sub-questions, along with some supplemental questions of I&Is and reserve unit commanders at the company/battery level and above across the MSCs of MFR.

The first sub-question is “PSR fulfills my units’ prior service personnel requirements?”; supplemented by “you indicated that PSR does or does not fulfill my units’ prior service personnel requirements. Please explain.” The second sub-question is

“the PSR chain of command is accessible to me?; supplemented by “you indicated that the PSR is or is not accessible to me. Please explain.” The third sub-question is “a PSR command under the Director, Reserve Affairs (HQMC) would provide accessibility to the PSR chain of command?”; supplemented by “you indicated that a PSR command under the Director, Reserve Affairs would or would not provide accessibility to the PSR chain of command. Please explain.” The fourth sub-question is “the command and control of a PSR command outside of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command would support my units’ prior service recruitment needs.” The fifth sub-question is “the command and control of PSR within the reserve component changes conditions for my interaction with PSR?”; supplemented by “you indicated that the command and control of PSR within the reserve component changes or does not change conditions for my interaction with PSR. Please explain.

### Chapter Summary

The researcher will conduct mixed research methodologies in order to derive evidence to support answering the primary research question of whether the current model for partially populating the MCR through PSR is ideally commanded and controlled by MCRC, while simultaneously providing career enhancing opportunities for the AR Marines who successfully perform on PSR duty. The research methodologies to be employed are the conduct of surveys and document reviews. The conduct of surveying the four varying Marine Corps population groupings will be in concert with all applicable Department of Defense and social science guidelines governing the use of human subjects in research, as validated by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Graduate Degree Programs’ Office of Quality Assurance.

The five secondary research questions provide the foundation of the research design to answer the primary research question. The secondary questions will be answered in part by quantitative evidence from survey questions, as well as qualitative evidence in support of several supplemental questions derived from each secondary question, or by evidence directly contributing to answering the secondary question itself. Ultimately, the preponderance of the evidence in support of or against the secondary questions will contribute to the yes or no answers. The criteria for determining definitive opinions is the numeric majority of respondents greater than 50 percent who either agree, disagree or are neutral, in their responses. Based on the wording any of the five secondary questions, a combination of yes and no answers of the secondary questions will provide the basis for answering the primary research question: yes, the current model is ideal, or no, the current model is not ideal. The corresponding proving or disproving of the hypothesis will largely be predicated on the collective, quantitative and qualitative responses of the survey participants.

## CHAPTER 4

## ANALYSIS

### Introduction

The execution of mixed research methodologies within the research design of this thesis proved fruitful with respect to generating evidence to ultimately answer the primary research question. The research methodology design included document review, as well as the solicitation of voluntary, confidential survey responses from four distinct, targeted populations of Marines who are affiliated with or knowledgeable of the Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) activity. With respect to the document review, it yielded substantive, historical information relating to the former command and control structure of PSR outside of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC). Additionally, the document reviews yielded significant depth of information relating to the current personnel construct within the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR), as well as within MCRC.

Within the four targeted survey populations, each grouping represented Marines from within the supported and supporting commands. Additionally, the current population of Active Reserve (AR) officers who have varying degrees of experience within the AR program and are potentially assignable to leadership billets on PSR duty, was a targeted group for the survey instrument. The supported command was represented by Inspector-Instructors (I&Is) and reserve unit commanders and senior enlisted advisors within subordinate units of Marine Forces Reserve (MFR). The supporting command was represented by elements within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), including District-level PSR personnel, as well as senior leadership at the District, Region

and MCRC headquarters levels. Table 4 represents the overall statistical results from the use of the survey instrument.

Table 4. Survey Response Statistics				
	Survey Populations	# of Survey Responses	# of Personnel Solicited	Total Response Rate
1	Current Slate of Field Grade and Company Grade Active Reserve (AR) Officers	113	291	38.83%
2	Current Slate of Inspector-Instructors, reserve unit commanders and senior enlisted advisors	97	453	21.41%
3	Senior recruiting leadership at the District, Region and MCRC HQ levels	27	92	29.35%
4	Current Slate of District-level PSR Personnel	39	137	28.47%
<b>Total</b>		<b>276</b>	<b>973</b>	<b>28.37%</b>

*Source:* Created by author. Results of survey instrument(s) from the Inquisite Survey System, provided to the author by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Quality Assurance Office (QAO), 13 March 2013.

Chapter 4 will analyze and present findings that emerged through the mixed research methodology. The chapter will be organized similar to chapter 3, with each of the five secondary research questions serving as its own subheading, where each specific sub-question's answers will be presented, along with any relative analysis. The qualitative responses provided by the survey respondents reflect experienced opinions of Marines or civilians who are presently serving in capacities which have a collective impact over the leadership and execution of total force recruiting. The chapter summary will present the overall findings yielded from the analysis.

Is MCRC Reliant upon the PSR force in order to Accomplish the Marine Corps' Annual Reserve NPS Accession Mission?

After the FY04 integration of Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) under the command and control of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), both non-prior service (NPS) and PSR production activities have been successful in their given recruiting missions.<sup>1</sup> Table 5 depicts the NPS enlisted recruiting mission and the total PSR mission objectives and attainment, from FY06 through FY12 (at the time of writing, MCRC could not release FY04 and FY05 data, due to system constraints that did not allow for verification of mission data from those years). Prior to FY04, PSR successfully achieved its numeric missions since 1982.<sup>2</sup> Since FY06, the PSR mission has accounted for between seven percent and 11 percent of MCRCs numeric NPS enlisted and PSR combined recruiting mission, while approximately 89 percent to 93 percent of MCRCs annual mission has been comprised of regular and reserve NPS enlisted procurement.<sup>3</sup> Because MCRCs reserve procurement mission is balanced between NPS and PSR, each individual mission is representative of a percentage of MCRCs annual reserve procurement mission. Table 6 depicts PSRs reserve recruiting percentage of MCRCs total reserve procurement mission. PSR has historically accounted for between 34.0 percent and 51.5 percent of MCRCs total reserve mission achieved from FY06 through FY12.

Table 5. MCRC Total Force Recruiting Missions

FY	NPS Regular			NPS Reserve			PSR			% TOTAL MCRC MSN
	Ach	Obj	%	Ach	Obj	%	Ach	Obj	%	
2006	32337	32304	100.1%	5880	5875	100.1%	3027	3027	100.0%	7%
2007	35603	35576	100.1%	5287	5289	100.0%	3591	3591	100.0%	8%
2008	37991	37967	100.1%	4236	4235	100.0%	4501	4501	100.0%	10%
2009	31413	31400	100.0%	5701	5701	100.0%	3862	3862	100.0%	9%
2010	28040	28000	100.1%	5868	5868	100.0%	4209	4209	100.0%	11%
2011	29758	29750	100.0%	5730	5730	100.0%	4054	4054	100.0%	10%
2012	30508	30501	100.0%	5450	5450	100.0%	4210	4210	100.0%	10%

Source: MCRC, total force enlisted and PSR recruiting mission data, FY06 through FY12. Electronic correspondence with author, 15 April 2013.

Table 6. MCRC Enlisted NPS Reserve Recruiting and PSR Missions

FY	NPS Reserve				PSR				% Total Res Msn
	Ach	Obj	%	% Total Res Msn	Ach	Obj	%		
2006	5880	5875	100.1%	66.0%	3027	3027	100.0%		34.0%
2007	5287	5289	100.0%	59.6%	3591	3591	100.0%		40.4%
2008	4236	4235	100.0%	48.5%	4501	4501	100.0%		51.5%
2009	5701	5701	100.0%	59.6%	3862	3862	100.0%		40.4%
2010	5868	5868	100.0%	58.2%	4209	4209	100.0%		41.8%
2011	5730	5730	100.0%	58.6%	4054	4054	100.0%		41.4%
2012	5450	5450	100.0%	56.4%	4210	4210	100.0%		43.6%

Source: MCRC total force recruiting mission data, FY06 through FY12. Electronic correspondence with author, 15 April 2013.

#### MCRCs Original design as a total force Recruiting Construct

Prior to 1993, the Marine Corps' NPS recruiting construct was commanded and controlled regionally.<sup>4</sup> The two extant Recruiting Region Commanding Generals (CG)

individually commanded and controlled their share of the total personnel procurement missions, answering directly to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).<sup>5</sup> The degree of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps' control over the personnel procurement process was through a relatively small staff of personnel within the manpower department, under the leadership of a General Officer.<sup>6</sup> Upon the creation and implementation of MCRC, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy, envisioned a single command whose CG would be the single commander for the Marine Corps' recruiting activity.<sup>7</sup>

Although the creation of MCRC enabled a single commander in charge of personnel procurement for the Marine Corps, it did not originally account for the command and control of the Marines responsible for the execution of the PSR mission. The PSR mission was executed by Marines commanded and controlled from within the MCR. Near simultaneous to the Marine Corps' implementation of MCRC, the onset of a few major studies conducted over the integration of total force recruiting began. Within the first five years of MCRCs existence, one Naval Audit Service study and one internal Marine Corps study occurred, examining the need to integrate PSR into MCRC.<sup>8</sup> Senior Marine Corps leadership rejected the studies' findings, thus rejecting the initial attempts to merge PSR into MCRCs command and control structure.<sup>9</sup> With the November 1998 report from their joint study, Colonels O. J. Milano and D. R. Selvage made a compelling case to merge PSR into MCRC. It was just over two years from the date of their report, until then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) General Michael Williams, directed CG, MCRC, to determine the feasibility of integrating PSR into MCRC. The ACMCs direction came as a result of the Marine Requirements Oversight

Council (MROC) process that met in February of 2001, with the ultimate decision made in April 2001.<sup>10</sup> At that point, MCRC set in motion a plan of action to assimilate PSR into the MCRC structure. Overall, MCRCs original blueprint did not include designs to integrate PSR, with that circumstance arriving years later, after several independent analyses and reviews.

#### The Systematic Methods of NPS Recruiting versus the Systematic Methods of Reserve PS Recruiting

The systematic recruiting process in use in MCRC today is a robust, time management-based approach towards achieving recruiting objectives.<sup>11</sup> The process itself is ostensibly the same among NPS and PSR, except for the acquisition of prospects' names and the end result: NPS applicants enlist, whereas as PSR applicants affiliate with reserve units. Figure 5 depicts the systematic recruiting process, highlighting the end result in both recruiting markets.




Figure 5. Systematic Recruiting Process

*Source:* United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for Recruiting Station Operations, Volume III* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, March 2004); United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for the Prior Service Recruiter, Volume VIII* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, April 2011).

Although both NPS recruiting and PSR personnel adhere to the same principles of systematic recruiting, one key difference between the two markets in which the recruiting activities take place is how the individual recruiters achieve the first step in the process.

The recruiting process starts with the acquisition of names of potentially qualified applicants, whether the applicants are NPS or PS. The continuous supply of names in the recruiting environment is essential to the recruiter's success.<sup>12</sup> NPS recruiting embodies much more in-depth methods of generating prospective applicants through five principal recruiting programs, plus additional, related programs. The programs are the high school/community college program, the pool program, the command recruiting program, the reenlistment card program, the reserve referral program and the recruiter aide program.<sup>13</sup> In addition to the major enlisted recruiting programs made available to the NPS recruiter, the recruiter himself is responsible for personally generating 40 percent of new contracts, where the additional 60 percent of his new contract sources are embedded within the programs.<sup>14</sup> Figure 6 depicts the new contract source goals within NPS recruiting operations.



Figure 6. New Contract Source Goals

Source: United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Recruiting Command Guidebook for Recruiting Operations, Volume III* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, March 2004).

From the PS recruiter's perspective, the acquisition of names is chiefly perpetuated through the Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System-Prior Service Recruiting (MCRISS-PSR).<sup>15</sup> In addition to the principal method of system-generated leads, there are other means by which a PS recruiter can gain names, such as referrals, returns, walk-ins, area canvassing and through social networking sites.<sup>16</sup> Overall, PS recruiters do not have to principally obtain names through their own initiative, as the names are provided. To the contrary, NPS recruiters are required to

generate lists of names through the high school/community college program, which requires the recruiters themselves to interact with educational institutions.<sup>17</sup>

Although both NPS and PS recruiters share similar systematic recruiting methods, neither of these entities relies on the other for any portion of name generation, recruiting programs or enlistment/affiliation percentages. The only major enlisted recruiting program from which NPS recruiting operations relies upon the MCR, is the reserve referral program. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (CMFR), not the PSR mechanism internal to MCRC, is responsible for providing CG, MCRC, with a percentage of prospective applicant leads which result in new contracts referred by Marines assigned to CMFRs subordinate commands. The reserve referral program's goal is the collective effort of the individual Marines assigned to the reserves in providing a cumulative 25 percent worth of MCRCs total annual NPS reserve contracting mission.<sup>18</sup> Through this program, the reserve Marines can receive individual credit applicable towards promotion points, as well as CMFR referring the requisite number of successful enlistments of reserve component enlistees.<sup>19</sup> Evaluation of the last seven years' worth of NPS enlisted recruiting operations source activity analyses yielded that Marine Forces Reserve did not uphold MCRCs reserve referral source goal of three percent of NPS enlistees sourced from reserve Marine referrals. While CMFR agrees to provide 25 percent of the NPS reserve contracting mission in the form of referrals, MCRCs goal from the reserve referral program is three percent of the total enlisted NPS contracting mission.<sup>20</sup> The 3 percent of the total NPS enlisted contracting mission that MCRC aims to achieve, is generally a lower number than the 25 percent of the NPS enlisted reserve mission which CMFR agrees to provide, on an annual basis. The extant disparity in the

agreement made and the actual source data which is managed by MCRC, demonstrates that either CMFR needs to agree to provide three percent of the total enlisted NPS contracting mission in the form of reserve referrals, or MCRC needs to change how it accounts for reserve referrals. Table 7 depicts CMFRs contribution to NPS new contracts from FY06 through FY12. For the entire timeline assessed, the subordinate commanders and I&Is within MFR did not accomplish the referral mission as measured by MCRCs new contract source goals from the reserve referral program.

Table 7. MCRC New NPS Contracts Sourced from Marine Corps Reserve

FY	MCRCs Total NPS Enlisted Mission	CMFRs 25% of NPS Reserve Mission	MCRCs Source Goal (3% of Total NPS)	Reserve Referral % Achieved	Reserve Referrals Achieved From MFR
2006	38179	1469	1145	1%	382
2007	40865	1322	1226	2%	817
2008	42202	1059	1266	2%	844
2009	37101	1425	1113	2%	742
2010	33868	1467	1016	2%	677
2011	35480	1433	1064	2%	710
2012	35951	1363	1079	1%	360

*Source:* Marine Corps Recruiting Command NPS Recruiting Activity Analysis, FY06 through FY12. Electronic correspondence with author, 5 April 2013. The “Reserve Referral Achieved From MFR” data is the result of the reported percentage of reserve referrals provided, multiplied by the MCRCs Total NPS Enlisted Mission figure.

**PSRs Influence in the Districts' NPS Reserve Recruiting Mission is  
Required for the District to Accomplish its NPS  
Reserve Recruiting Mission?**

The majority of the senior MCRC leadership serving at the District HQ and above, 63 percent (17 out of 27 total respondents), disagreed that PSRs influence in the district's NPS reserve recruiting mission is required for the district to accomplish its NPS reserve recruiting mission. PSR does not supply any influence over NPS reserve recruiting. Essentially confirming what the documentary review yielded, there are no extant recruiting programs or initiatives internal to MCRC, which require either NPS or PS recruiting operations to support the other. If any referrals potentially occur, they occur by way of the initiative of the individual Marines involved. This specific question did not elicit qualitative response from the survey participants.

**Summary for Secondary Question Number one**

Overall, MCRC does not rely upon PSR in supporting the execution of the NPS reserve recruiting mission. If PSR were to cease to exist, there would be no impact to MCRCs ability to achieve its enlisted NPS reserve mission. Both MCRC and PSR under its former command prior to FY04, were successful in attaining their respective, annual recruiting missions prior to the integration of PSR into MCRC. Since that time, MCRC has succeeded in achieving its annual mission objectives, across the total force recruiting construct. PSR maintained its ability to achieve its specific mission, not having gained any additional ability to achieve its mission as a result of integration into MCRCs command and control. Both NPS recruiting and PSR execute systematic recruiting principles, in order to achieve their respective missions. The only dependence upon the MCR which MCRC subjects itself is the annual agreement between CG, MCRC, and

CMFR, where CMFR provides referrals for the enlistment of 25 percent of MCRCs enlisted NPS reserve accession mission. MCRC tracks as the reserve referral source, a figure aiming for three percent of the total enlisted NPS new contract mission, not the 25 percent of the enlisted NPS reserve mission figure which CMFR agrees to support on an annual basis. Over the course of the preceding seven years, CMFR and his subordinate commanders have missed the 3 percent referral support objective during each of those FYs, according to MCRCs measure of the recruiting program. Finally, nearly two-thirds of senior recruiting leadership respondents disagreed with the notion that PSRs influence in the districts' NPS reserve recruiting mission is required for the district to achieve its NPS reserve recruiting mission, confirming MCRCs non-reliance on PSR in achieving the NPS reserve mission.

Does the Current Task Organization of PSR within MCRC Provide Conditions for Fairness and Equitability among all Assigned Recruiting Personnel?

PSR Personnel are evaluated fairly?

While not a majority, the greatest percentage of respondents, 43.6 percent (17 out of 39 respondents) agreed that PSR personnel are evaluated fairly. The response rate of less than 50 percent indicates a lack of an overall degree of confidence in fair evaluations among the respondents from the district-level PSR personnel. One respondent who agreed indicated,

PS recruiters are evaluated by the PSRS CO/OIC . . . the fitreps are done IAW the PES and the officer evaluates them against other Marines of that rank and against other recruiters. In regards to the Reviewing Officer comments and evaluation, the PSRS CO/OIC speaks with the District CO and between the two officers a fair evaluation is made that is commensurate with the RO profile.

It is evident that at the point of conducting performance evaluations, the reporting seniors and reviewing officers make every effort to communicate appropriate markings and comments for individual PSR personnel. Another respondent indicated,

Out here on recruiting duty, if you make your assigned monthly mission, you will be evaluated accordingly. If you fail to meet the recruiting monthly standards, then there will be consequences. If you go above and beyond...your tour will reflect positively. If a PSR is average, then the reports and accolades will be just that.

It appears that overall, PSR Marines, generally enlisted PSR personnel, approach the issue of fairness in the evaluation process as one that is directly tied to performance results.

Conversely, a respondent who disagreed indicated,

The lack of focus/importance placed on PSR by MCRC's active component leadership, generally leads to a lack of understanding and appreciation for the difficulty/challenges of PSR duty. This translates to an under-valued assessment on a Marine's FITREP. This is especially true for the PSR OIC, who is being evaluated against the District's RS CO's, who are board selected to command a Recruiting Station and are the focus of the District Leadership.

Seemingly from an AR officer's perspective, there is a discernible divide between the mission that PSR OIC leads and the mission that the RSCO leads, in the eyes of the MCD CO. This view leads to the appearance that NPS recruiting is the focus of the district, thus the relegation of the PSR personnel behind NPS personnel, in terms of performance evaluations.

#### NPS and PS Recruiting Missions are Similar Missions?

The majority of respondents, 59.3 percent (16 out of 27 total respondents), disagreed that NPS and PS recruiting missions are similar missions. A respondent who disagreed indicated, "all elements of the recruiting process are different; from lead

generation all the way through to ship/accession. Other than the MOS (8411/8412) of the force there is really no similarity.” NPS applicants and PS Marines are representative of two entirely different Marine Corps recruiting markets. The skills it takes to effect the successful recruitment in either market, are different.

Another respondent indicated,

It’s comparing apples to oysters. NPS sales are much different and centered around 17 or 18 year old high school seniors . . . the two are almost completely exclusive. PSR recruiting could shut down for good right now and it would have no impact on our ability to make NPS reserve mission (shipping or contracting).

Selling the Marine Corps to a NPS applicant is largely predicated on selling the intangibles that the Marine Corps has to offer. Selling the reserves to a PS Marine is more aligned with tangible benefits, such as job skills and networking, drill pay or medical benefits derived from reserve military service. Overall, the two separate recruiting markets require different approaches and systems, in order to successfully achieve results. NPS recruiting requires a wider degree of communication skill, based on the minimal product knowledge that prospects within the NPS market possess.

#### RSCOs have a more Difficult Recruiting Mission than PSR OICs?

While not a majority, the greatest percentage of respondents, 48.1 percent (13 out of 27 total respondents), agreed that RSCOs have a more difficult recruiting mission than PSR OICs. The response rate of less than the majority indicates a lack of an overall high degree of confidence among senior recruiting leaders that RSCOs have a more difficult mission. It is prudent to analyze responses from both those that agreed and those that disagreed. A respondent who agreed indicated, “RSCOs have to accomplish NPS regular and reserve missions, the OSO mission, and NROTC scholarships submissions, while

leading, managing and being responsible for 20-25 installations, 50-75 recruiters, and 50 vehicles. Commanders are screened for billet assignments, OIC's are not." The fact that PSR OICs are not screened and formally selected for the duty presents a bias towards the command-screening process among MCRCs senior recruiting leadership, to the chagrin of the PSR OICs. This view is indicative of the larger culture within MCRC that does not outwardly accommodate or welcome PSR personnel as equals, with PSR nested among the NPS personnel. The scope of an RSCOs burden of command generally demonstrates that RSCO duty is more difficult than PSR OIC duty, for a Marine Major.

A respondent who disagreed indicated, "RSCO's are typically within driving distance of all of their Marines, usually no more than four-five hours max . . . PSR OIC's have regional travel to consider to get out to their Marines, small support staff, limited opportunities to provide daily supervision other than over the phone." Due to the nature of the expanse of reserve units within the extant district areas of operation within which the PSR OICs mission lies, PSR OICs are unable to physically go to their Marines as frequently as RSCOs are able to do so with their subordinates. The reduced opportunities for the PSR OIC to physically see his Marines, increases the leadership difficulty with which the PSR OIC must contend.

#### PSR OICs Should be board Selected, Similar to RSCOs?

The majority of respondents, 63 percent (17 out of 27 total respondents), agreed that PSR OICs should be board selected similar to RSCOs. In light of the agreed responses from the previous question, senior MCRC leaders are clearly desirous of PSR OICs withstanding the rigor of a formal selection process. While a formal selection process would be a positive, uplifting experience for the AR officer, placing a highly

qualified AR officer in charge of the PSR mission would also present the PSR Marines themselves with the expectation that their OIC is highly capable of leading them. NPS recruiters know they are getting highly qualified officers as RSCOs, based on the reality of the selection process. This question did not elicit qualitative response from the respondents.

#### PSR Career Recruiter SNCOICs Perform the same Mission as NPS Career Recruiter SNCOICs?

While not a majority, the greatest percentage of respondents, 50 percent (13 out of 26 total respondents), agreed that PSR career recruiter staff non-commissioned officers-in-charge (SNCOIC) perform the same mission as NPS career recruiter SNCOICs. The response rate demonstrates a lack of confidence that the two types of career recruiters perform the same mission. One respondent who agreed indicated, “SNCOICs job is to lead, train and mentor the Marines assigned to them, regardless of the mission.” Another respondent indicated “Both sets of recruiters have a mission that they have to recruit to, however they have different tools at their disposal to help them in their recruiting effort. Also, the PSR recruiter recruits both officer and enlisted Marines where as NPS recruiters focus exclusively on the enlisted side.” Ultimately, the PSR SNCOICs leadership functions are practically the same as the NPS SNCOICs, predicated on training and managing their subordinate recruiters’ activities.

A respondent who disagreed indicated “PSR SNCOICs aren’t going into high schools, managing 17 year old poolees, getting parental consent, etc. The dynamics seem completely different to me aside from the fact that there is an administrative burden to bring a person into the corps or back into the corps as a reenlistment.” With regard to the

conduct of PSR versus NPS recruiting, the role of the career recruiter SNCOIC is tailored to the actual mission of the subordinate recruiters. NPS recruiters perform a broader range of recruiting tasks, thus necessitate the NPS career recruiter SNCOIC to be accountable for a wider range of his or her subordinate's activities.

Another respondent's agreement to the question also reflects some of the culture within MCRC, particularly within the 8412 community. The respondent stated, "similar only in that they are both recruiters. A PSR recruiter (8412) is not interchangeable with a NPS recruiter (8412)." It is clear that among the senior MCRC leader population surveyed, the fact that PSR and NPS enlisted recruiters possesses the same MOS by number, does not translate to the skills and abilities of the PSR personnel as being the same as those which NPS recruiting personnel possess.

#### PSR Recruiters (8411s) Conduct the same Mission as NPS recruiters (8411s)?

While not a majority, the greatest percentage of respondents, 40.7 percent (11 out of 27 total respondents), disagreed that PSR recruiters conduct the same mission as NPS recruiters. The fact that the most popular response was less than 50 percent, indicates a lack of a definitive opinion that PSR and NPS recruiters do not conduct the same mission. It is prudent to analyze responses from those who both agreed and disagreed with the question. A respondent who disagreed indicated, "A PS recruiter is calling a Marine and looking to assist that Marine in his transition to civilian life . . . a NPS recruiter is challenging a civilian to become a Marine . . . to say they are the same is like saying Toyota Carolla and Ford Focus are the same. They are both sedans, but different cars." Because of the difference in the representative recruiting markets, PSR recruiters do not

necessarily perform the same recruiting mission as NPS recruiters. There are intricacies associated with the execution of both types of recruiting that differentiate them from one another.

A respondent who agreed that both PSR recruiters and NPS recruiters conduct the same mission indicated, “they each have specific missions to recruit to, though they may vary as to how they are specifically similar . . . the tools available and techniques used to recruit will vary, but the intent is the same.” While the ends are virtually the same between the two types of recruiters, the ways and means by which the recruiters execute their duties are different.

#### Summary for Secondary Question Number two

Overall, the current task organization of the PSR construct within MCRC does not provide for conditions of fairness and equitability among all assigned recruiting personnel. Although the greatest percentage of PSR Marines who responded, agreed that personnel evaluations are fair, only 43 percent agreed. A belief persists among PSR personnel that the district leadership is primarily focused on the NPS mission, which is reasonable since NPS accounts for the majority of the district’s total force recruiting mission. This fact, however, generally translates to the belief among PSR personnel that they are ranked lower than their NPS counterparts in the district, when MCD COs serve as reporting seniors or reviewing officers in the personnel evaluation process. With regards to the similarity in both mission sets, it is clear that PS and NPS recruiting are two distinctly separate missions. RSCOs have a more difficult mission to command, largely predicated on the scope and size of their commands, in contrast to the smaller mission led by the PSR OIC. Although senior MCRC leaders agree that PSR OICs should

be board selected, the fact that they currently are not, does not nest well within the MCRC culture, as RSCOs are board selected to assume the burden of command on recruiting duty. While it is believed that both PSR and NPS career recruiter SNCOICs perform similarly in their given roles, particularly in leading, coaching and instructing their recruiters, the NPS career recruiter 8412 is clearly held in higher regard within the MCRC culture. Although the greatest percentage of respondents disagreed that PS recruiters do not conduct the same as NPS recruiters (8411s), only 40 percent disagreed. The end result of both recruiters' missions are the same, while the ways and means of arriving at mission success are different, from the perspective of MCRCs senior recruiting leaders.

**Are AR Marines Inspired to serve on PSR duty in its Current Construct?**

**The Establishment of a Formal PSR OIC Selection board would Attract more AR Officers to serve on PSR Duty?**

While not a majority, the greatest percentage of respondents, 46.4 percent (52 out of 112 total respondents), agreed that the establishment of a formal PSR OIC selection board would attract more AR officers to serve on PSR duty. The fact less than 50 percent agreed, is indicative of an overall lack of confidence of the current AR officer population. Similar to the process by which active component Majors or Majors (select) are selected for duty as RSCOs, a selection process for identifying the next PSR OICs could provide greater extrinsic motivation for AR officers to serve on the duty in the capacity as OICs. Perhaps converting the billet title to Commanding Officer, vice OIC, could also influence an AR officers' motivation to serve on PSR duty. Being publicly identified as having withstood the rigor of a competitive selection process would provide AR officers with the

requisite credibility to lead the Marines under their charge on PSR duty. This survey question did not elicit qualitative response from the respondents.

**Having PSR Billets under the Command and Control of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command Positively Affects my Desire to serve on PSR duty?**

The majority of respondents, 57 percent (65 out of 114 total respondents), indicated neutrality to this question. It is prudent to assess qualitative responses from those who both agreed and disagreed with this question, in order to analyze the AR officers' opinions.

A respondent who agreed indicated,

I know that MCRC will ensure professional, well-trained, disciplined recruiting with access to all the schools, remediation, advertising, community events, etc. It creates a very professional organization, and I would much rather serve in that type of organization than some ad hoc, second-best outfit.

MCRC is widely known in the Marine Corps as a highly professional, efficient organization. It is evident that AR officers' perception of service within MCRC is positive, based on the professional reputation of the organization as a whole.

Another respondent who agreed stated,

MCRC is best configured and resourced to perform the PSR function. There is a commonality of mission with PSR under the C2 of MCRC, which would not be the same if PSR were under the C2 of HQMC RA or MFR. This also proved to be the case during the first 20 years of PSR's existence when it was C2'd by MCRSC.

MCRC is the recruiting resource for the Marine Corps. Although PSR was previously commanded and controlled from within the MCR that did not necessarily mean that it was the best postured for the PS recruiting activity. Conversely, a respondent who disagreed indicated that,

PSR is such a small part of the MCRC focus that is mostly seen as an after-thought by senior leaders (although they likely will not admit that). This generally leads to a decreased understanding by senior active component leaders within MCRC (i.e. those serving as FITREP RSs and ROs) of the challenges and degree of difficulty in PSR. This generally translates into lower FITREP rankings for PSR OICs, as compared to their RS CO counterparts.

Perception among AR officers is that an officer serving in the PSR OIC billet does not necessarily compete well against the RSCOs, in the form of annual performance evaluations. Due to the apparent minimal size of the PSR OICs assets and mission, compared to a RSCOs assets and mission, the likelihood of a MCD CO to not view the PSR OICs mission as equal, generally translates to the AR officer being ranked lower than RSCOs within the MCD COs reporting senior, relative values. Similarly, another respondent indicated,

Relative value of fitreps will be a concern, no matter how great of a job that the PSR OIC does. The AR Officer is slated by the monitor for a mission that is relatively small in comparison to that of recruiters at an RS. AC Officers are board chosen & slated for a much larger mission. I would expect that Majors serving as RS Commanders will all be ranked ahead of PSR OICs.

Again, perception among AR officers is that their collective efforts as leaders of Marines on PSR duty would not be enough to provide them equal opportunity for fair assessment within the personnel evaluation system. It appears that MCRC is preferred for command and control of PSR.

#### Placement of PSR Billets under the Command and Control of a Different Marine Corps Agency (Other Than MCRC) would Positively Affect my Desire to serve on PSR duty?

The majority of respondents, 52.2 percent (60 out of 115 total respondents), indicated neutrality for this question. It is important to draw out the respondents' opinions, both who agree and disagree. A respondent who agreed indicated "I feel that

the AR program needs to be under the command and control of a unit that understands the need for the growth of its own officers.” In its current task organization, PSR duty necessitates subordination to the MCD CO, along with eight RSCOs and their Marines, all of whom are considered the best and brightest the Marine Corps has to offer. It is evident that a MCD CO likely does not have the time or inclination to truly mentor his AR officer under his or her charge, to the chagrin of the AR officer, in terms of not receiving career mentorship specific to his or her career in support of the MCR. Similarly, the PSR OICs subordinate AR personnel potentially lose out on their senior leadership’s lack of understanding of their given career paths.

Conversely, a respondent who disagreed indicated,

I would not want to serve on recruiting duty with an organization outside of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, which has the operational, training, oversight, and logistics infrastructure to best support PSR. Finally, I believe PSR would be continuously exposed to the whims of RA and MFR (jerked around) if not under the MCRC umbrella.

MCRC is viewed as the appropriate command under which PSR is executed, particularly as it relates to the AR officers’ view of being assigned to PSR duty.

**A PSR Tour of duty within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command  
was one of your top three Choices for duty Assignment?**

While not a majority, the greatest percentage of respondents, 43.6 percent (17 out of 39 total respondents), agreed that their individual assignments to PSR duty were within their respective top three choices of assignment within the AR program. The fact that the most popular response was less than 50 percent indicates a lack of confidence in the AR Marines’ overall desire to choose PSR duty as one of their top three choices of duty. This question did not elicit qualitative response from the respondents.

**Serving on PSR duty within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command Provides  
Incentives for you to earn Recognition Through  
Exceptional Performance?**

The majority of respondents, 71.2 percent (28 out of 39 total respondents), indicated that service on PSR duty within the MCRC, provides incentives to earn through exceptional performance. One respondent indicated “I agree that MCRC provides ample opportunity to earn recognition for each recruiter by allowing them to compete internally to their district, for awards. Some examples of these awards are recruiter of the month, blackjack award, slugger award, heavy hitter award, centurion, and recruiter of the year.” Marine Corps recruiting duty is very similar to a performing in a production business. Competition among individual recruiters to earn recognition is prevalent. Competition among recruiting units is also very realistic. The higher the degree of output by an individual or unit results in recognition for exceptional performance. With respect to the potential for meritorious promotion as a PSR Marine, which is highly coveted within the enlisted ranks, one respondent indicated,

MCRC has allocation for Special Duty Assignment (SDA) Meritorious Promotions on an annual basis. Generally (1) quota for Sgt to SSgt and (1) quota for SSgt to GySgt Meritorious Promotion. Additionally, the MCRC Prior Service Recruiter of the Year and SNCOIC of the Year Awards recognized the top performers in these areas. The winner of the MCRC Prior Service Recruiter of the Year can earn meritorious promotion up to the rank of SSgt or GySgt, as well.

**Summary for Secondary Question Number three**

Overall, AR Marines are neutral in their inspiration to serve on PSR duty in its current construct. Although a majority of AR officers did not respond in agreement with establishing a PSR OIC selection board to attract more AR officers to PSR duty, the most popular response was that a PSR OIC selection board would attract more officers to be inspired to serve on the duty. A compelling opinion among AR officers is that MCRC is

the appropriate command under which PSR should be task organized, predicated on the professionalism of MCRC as a whole. A dissenting opinion among AR officers is that because of the current PSR subordination within the MCDs, PSR personnel are likely not receiving fair performance evaluations based on the disparity between the NPS and PS recruiting missions. MCRCs responsibility is predominately enlisted NPS regular and reserve, thus PSR is viewed as insignificant in the aggregate mission. Among AR officers, there remains a perception that PSR subordination within the MCD does not set conditions for the AR officer to receive an adequate benefit from the senior-subordinate relationship with the MCD CO. Because AR officers serve on active duty in support of the MCR, their given career paths are generally outside the purview of the MCD CO. In addition, personnel currently assigned to PSR duty generally desired assignment to the duty as a top three choice, understanding its task organization within MCRC. Almost three fourths of respondents (71.2 percent) affirmed that there is ample opportunity for recognition for exceptional performance while assigned to duty within MCRC, through categories of competitive recruiting at the national and district levels.

Can the USMC RC Absorb the Manpower Sourcing Requirements for a PSR force as a stand-alone Command?

How the Director, RA Can Task Organize a PSR Command under the Control of RA

The MCR is positioned to accomplish the plethora of responsibilities in accounting for its Title 10 provisions, seated in federal law. Specifically, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, § 12310 states that the “Secretary concerned may order a member of a reserve component under the Secretary’s jurisdiction to active duty to perform Active Guard and Reserve duty organizing, administering, recruiting,

instructing, or training the reserve components.”<sup>21</sup> The foundation provided by federal law, coupled with senior Marine Corps leadership approval of unit task organization, sets the conditions for change. The manner in which the MCR formerly executed PSR from within Marine Forces Reserve is demonstrative of how the MCR task organized its Title 10 responsibility in partially populating the reserves with prior service (PS) personnel. Approximately 42 percent of the MCR annual reserve recruiting mission market rests within the PS population in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The other approximate 58 percent is comprised of the non-prior service (NPS) market, in which the Marine Corps’ NPS mechanism executes the accession task among high school seniors, recent high school graduates or college students.<sup>22</sup> Table 8 depicts the Marine Corps enlisted NPS reserve recruiting and PSR missions achieved, FY06 through FY12. The PSR figures account for reserve affiliations achieved among the PSR categories of Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) officer and enlisted, Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) officer and enlisted, the AR program, as well as those who were affiliated above and beyond the category requirements.

Table 8. Marine Corps Reserve Recruiting Mission FY06-FY12

FY	PSR Achieved	NPS Achieved	Total Reserves	PSR % of Total
2006	3027	5880	8907	34.0%
2007	3591	5287	8878	40.4%
2008	4501	4236	8737	51.5%
2009	3862	5701	9563	40.4%
2010	4209	5868	10077	41.8%
2011	4054	5730	9784	41.4%
2012	4210	5450	9660	43.6%

*Source:* MCRC. Enlisted NPS reserve recruiting missions achieved and PSR missions achieved from FY06 through FY12, electronic correspondence with author, 1 March 2013.

The Director Reserve Affairs, representing the Commandant of the Marine Corps with Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps cognizance over the MCR, could task organize a PSR command under his control, accounting for the execution of the PS percentage of the Marine Corps' annual reserve accession or affiliation mission. Although non-existent today due to the FY04 alignment of the current total force recruiting construct within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), a PSR-specific command element comprised mainly of Active Reserve (AR) Marines could serve as the operational command and control mechanism under the authority of the Director Reserve Affairs, thus able to partially fulfill Title 10 responsibility in recruiting the reserves, from within the reserve component. MCRC has long executed the NPS enlisted accession mission, accounting for both the regular and reserve components, thus would continue service in the NPS market, in partially populating reserve units with NPS reserve personnel.<sup>23</sup>

With respect to the task organization and execution of the United States Army Reserve's (USAR) reserve PSR and retention mission, the USAR conducts its mission differently from the way in which the Marine Corps executes total force recruiting, though from the same Title 10 authority. The USAR is comprised of 205,000 personnel, 16,277 of which are AGR personnel.<sup>24</sup> The USAR commands and controls its reserve PSR and retention mission internal to its reserve component.<sup>25</sup> Task organized as the Army Reserve Careers Division (ARCD), commanded by an Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Colonel, this command is further task organized into 13 subordinate battalions across the United States, each of which are commanded by AGR Lieutenant Colonels.<sup>26</sup> The U.S. Army as a whole places a great degree of confidence in its reserve component's ability to execute the unique task of reserve PSR and retention. In contrast to a Marine Corps District (MCD), the AGR Colonel who commands the ARCD, has a wider span of control than the (MCD) Commanding Officer, a Marine Colonel, who commands eight subordinate Recruiting Stations (RS) within his area of operation. The sheer size of the USAR can be argued as the impetus behind such a footprint for command and control of its reserve PSR and retention mission. The USAR recognizes that its subordinate commands benefit more from ARCD as an USAR asset, as opposed to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) executing an Army total force recruiting construct, such as the Marine Corps presently does.

#### How a Viable PSR Command is Structured

Prior to 2004, PSR was commanded and controlled by the Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, via his subordinate Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (MCRSC). The former CG, MCRSC, task organized the control of

PSR through the Head, Prior Service Recruiting Division, who led a 13-man staff at MCRSC, along with six regional PSR offices, and two transitional recruiting offices located on both coasts.<sup>27</sup> The MCR formerly executed the PSR mission from within the MFR, with a senior AR officer in charge of the activity as a whole, who reported to the responsible General Officer. Since the Marine Corps' 2001 Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) decision directing the reorganization of total force recruiting, MCRC elected to task organize PSR within the extant MCD structure, subordinating PSR to the MCD Commanding Officer.<sup>28</sup> Due to the inherent challenges with which the Recruiting Station Commanding Officers (RSCOs) contend on a daily basis, MCRC opted to incorporate PSR under the district's command and control, retaining the PSR OIC and his accompanying staff within each district.<sup>29</sup> PSR staff personnel were assigned to MCRC and Recruiting Region G-3 Operations sections, in order to integrate the PSR mission within those headquarters echelons.<sup>30</sup>

Utilizing the 9th Marine Corps District Headquarters' (HQ) table of organization as the basis for analysis, it is evident that an existing MCD HQ is a robust entity, capable of the command and control of subordinate RSs in the execution of their assigned personnel procurement missions. Although the implementation of a stand-alone PSR command HQ would not quite mirror that of a MCD HQ, the MCD HQs structure enables a starting point for determining an adequate structure. Table 9 depicts the total personnel structure across the functional areas within the 9th MCD HQ. Total chargeable HQ personnel equal 74, minus the district's PSRS personnel, (with PSR ordinarily captured under the PSR Section on the district's table of organization). The total includes two MCR, field grade officers who serve in a reserve drilling status within the HQ as

Recruiting Support Officers (RSO). The MCD HQ comprises just over nine percent of the district's total table of organization structure (74 of 838, not including PSR personnel).<sup>31</sup>

Section	Field Grade	Co Grade	SNCO (8412)	SNCO	NCO & below	CIV	Total
<b>District HQ</b>							
CO (Colonel)	1						
XO (LTCOL)	1						
SGT MAJ				1			
Secretary						1	
Career Planner				1			
Family Readiness O						1	
Chaplain		1					
Recruiting Support Officer	2						
Admin Branch		1		1	2	1	
District HQ Totals	4	2	0	3	2	3	
Pers Admin Branch		1			9	2	
<b>Operations Section</b>							
Personnel Procurement Branch	1					2	
Enlisted Procurement Branch	1	1	2	3	2		
Officer Procurement Branch	1	1	1				
Contact Team	1		4				
Operations Total	4	2	7	3	2	2	
<b>District Marketing Section</b>							
Marketing Branch		1			1		
Logistics Branch	1	2		2	3	4	
Comptroller Branch	1			1		4	
Public Affairs Branch		1		1	3		
Integrated Syst Mgmt Branch						3	
District Marketing Totals	2	4	0	4	7	11	
9th MCD HQ Totals	10	9	7	10	20	18	74

*Source:* Created by author. 9th Marine Corps District Table of Organization and Equipment Report structure data, 5 October 2012. Derived from the Marine Corps Total Force Management System, and synthesized by the author to reflect only the HQ, chargeable structure, minus the PSR Section.

Upon review of an extant MCD HQs structure, the adequate command and control of eight subordinate RSs requires functional staff cognizance in personnel administration, operations, logistics and supply, fiscal and public affairs. The MCD Commanding Officer maintains several additional support billet holders in the form of the Executive Officer, Sergeant Major, Adjutant, Career Planner and a Family Readiness Officer. The burden of command for the MCD CO necessitates the size and scope of his HQ staff.

#### Ability of Existing AR Personnel Structure to Support the Creation of a stand-alone PSR Command

Analyzing the current MCD HQ table of organization against the current PSR personnel assigned to the MCRC and Region HQs, it is obvious that executing only a shift of the extant structure into a stand-alone PSR command HQ structure, would not create a sufficient HQ element in order to command and control PSR. The creation of a stand-alone PSR command HQ sourced from the AR program should parallel the functional structure within a MCD HQ, though at a scaled-down level, due to a reduced subordinate footprint in the form of existing district level PSR assets. A PSR command HQ would require full resourcing through internal personnel compensation from existing structure aligned to the MCRC and Region HQs, as well as other personnel compensation internal to the AR program. Table 10 depicts current PSR structure aligned to the MCRC and Region HQ staffs.

Table 10. Current PSR Billet Structure Aligned to MCRC/WRR/ERR HQs

Rank	80XX	8999	8006	0180	3002	0193	4821	0111	0491	3043	34XX	8412	CIV
Col													
LTCOL			1										
MAJ			3										
Capt/1stLt			1										
SGT MAJ**													
MGySgt												2	
MSgt												2	
GySgt												6	
SSgt													
NCO and Below								1					
Civilian													
Total	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	10	0
											Total	16	

Source: United States Marine Corps, Active Reserve Program August 2012 Authorized Strength Report (ASR), electronic correspondence with author, 28 November 2012.

#### What the Process is for Enacting AR Personnel, Internal Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' AR program has existed since 1994.<sup>32</sup> Over the course of the 19 years of the program's existence, there have been three major structure review processes executed, in efforts to improve the efficacy of the program in its support of the MCR, and the Marine Corps as a whole.<sup>33</sup> The benefits of the AR structure review processes that have occurred have been the requisite internal structure adjustments to sustain emerging manpower requirements in support of command initiatives. The AR structure review process historically has been chartered by the Deputy Commandants of Manpower and Reserve (M&RA) Affairs, and Combat Development and Integration (CD&I). The AR structure review process is not a scheduled process, but rather one which is chartered and executed based principally upon the recommendation of the Director, Reserve Affairs. Subsequent board participation is supported by representatives

from the multiple Marine Forces' (MARFOR) HQ, MCRC, as well as the varying Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) agencies.<sup>34</sup> In past structure review processes, specifically 2005, 2009, and most recently in 2013, zero growth in AR end strength was achieved, while simultaneously allowing for unit Tables of Organization and Equipment Change Requests (TOECR) to account for the structural changes upon which the major commands agreed throughout the review process.<sup>35</sup>

Upon the completion of the AR structure review board process, the resultant structural change recommendations are ultimately approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). Upon approval, the structure change is executed through the Total Force Structure Division (TFSD), under the control of the Deputy Commandant CD&I.<sup>36</sup> When the structure is implemented, the adjustments to authorized strength reports (ASR) occur, enabling the incorporation of the newly aligned structure through the personnel assignments process. Overall, the means to request and execute the chartering of an AR structure review process rests in the collective decision-making process of the Deputy Commandants for M&RA and CD&I.

Assigning a Command-Screened, AR Colonel to Command and Control the  
PSR force Creates Greater career Opportunity for me as  
an AR Officer?

The majority of the AR officers, 63.4 percent (73 out 115 total respondents), indicated that assigning a command screened AR Colonel to command and control the PSR force creates greater career opportunity for them as AR officers. By law, reserve officers serving in full-time support (FTS) roles, are only promotable through the rank of Colonel. An AR officer at the rank of Colonel is serving in his or her terminal rank on active duty, in pursuit of an active duty retirement.<sup>37</sup> With respect to the survey's

qualitative responses, there were several responses that support the alignment of a command- screened Colonel, to serve as the Commanding Officer of a PSR command HQ. One respondent stated “AR command opportunities are very limited, yet desirable. I support calculated staffing decisions that open additional command billets for AR officers . . . so long as they are tied directly to our Title 10 and DoD Instruction 1205.18 responsibilities.” The core foundation of the reserve’s Title 10 responsibilities includes recruiting as a specified task. The creation of a PSR HQ, commanded by an AR Colonel, fulfills organizational requirements by law, as well as providing a command opportunity for an AR officer, from which to execute Title 10 provisions.

Another respondent indicated,

Not sure why this requires an explanation at all as it appears self evident. The more command opportunities for 06 level AR officers, the more opportunities for all AR officers as a whole. Also, the AR has a vested interest in the health and success of the reserve in the total force . . . who better to lead the PSR force than an AR Colonel who is keenly aware of what drives Marines to serve again.

A senior AR officer generally possesses substantial experience serving on active duty in support of the MCR. The degree of experience that he or she possesses would ensure the highest level of reserve buy-in applicable towards the necessity of executing PSR, in support of partially populating reserve units.

Another respondent indicated “allows for a command path for AR Colonels and would place a commander who knows the needs of the reserves, in charge of helping to recruit former Marines.” AR officers aspire to command no differently than other component or categories of Marine officers. Opportunities for command with the AR program are limited, though the creation of a PSR command would provide opportunity and realistic goals for company grade and younger field grade officers, who desire to

command. With respect to the limited opportunities at command for the AR officer population, there are presently three out of 32 billets for AR Colonels (9.4 percent), and eight out of 88 billets for AR Lieutenant Colonels (9.1 percent), within the statutorily provided structure.<sup>38</sup>

#### Summary for Secondary Question Number four

Overall, the MCR can absorb the manpower sourcing requirements in implementing a stand-alone PSR command HQ, through existing processes and procedures relative to AR personnel structure change. The Marine Corps as a whole, more specifically the MCR, is supported by the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C. in how it may ultimately organize in the execution of its statutory tasks. The creation of a PSR command, principally sourced from the AR program, would require an AR structure review process, as well as other HQMC approval actions, in which the reality of zero growth in AR personnel would have to be accomplished. AR personnel structure has previously withstood the rigor of significant, M&RA and CD&I chartered process reviews on three occasions, including the most recent 2013 AR structure review. Additionally, nearly two-thirds of AR officer respondents indicated that the assignment of a command-screened AR Colonel would provide greater career opportunities for them as AR officers.

Are the Supported Commands Supportive of a shift in the  
Command and Control of PSR under the  
Director, Reserve Affairs?

**PSR Fulfills my Units' Prior Service (PS) Personnel Requirements?**

The majority of the personnel, 50.5 percent (50 out 99 total respondents), indicated that PSR fulfills their units' needs. With respect to the qualitative responses, there are two overarching views of respondents that stand out, regarding PSR fulfilling units' needs. The first is that "PSR funnels former active duty candidates for our unit to interview and potential placement for a billet opening." For a supported unit leader to acknowledge the PSR support as such, shows that the PSR recruiter is communicating well with his supported commands, and vice versa. Additionally, a response indicating "strong ties to the PSR in our area has brought numerous prior enlisted and officer personnel to our unit," is demonstrative of the use of good communication between the supported unit and the PSR recruiter. It is clear that unit leaders are gainfully involved in the relationship with PSR at the individual recruiter level, in order to realize the necessary recruiting actions in support of their units' needs.

**The PSR Chain of Command is Accessible to me?**

The majority of respondents, 60.8 percent (59 out of 97 total respondents), indicated that the PSR chain of command is accessible to them from their respective leadership positions as unit I&Is, reserve unit commanders or unit senior enlisted advisors. In its current form, the accessibility to the PSR chain of command is notable. Of the total PSR presence at or in proximity to supported reserve units, very few reserve unit leaders have physical access to the PSR Officer-in-Charge (OIC). The majority of reserve unit leaders only physically interact with the individual recruiters assigned in support of

their given units, as the recruiters are the only PSR personnel with whom the unit leaders have routine access. Although the majority of respondents indicate accessibility to the chain of command, there were a variety of qualitative responses from those in agreement that demonstrated unit key leader difficulty in accessing the entire PSR chain of command. Of note, “normally the chain of command is an NCO or SNCO. Very rarely are I&Is or units provided with OIC information.” Additionally, “the chain of command is accessible because we moved them into the building and gave them an office next to our S-1. This was achieved through personality and relationships, not due to any formal requirements for interaction.” Without an initiative to physically go to all supported reserve units as a matter of annual, standard operating procedure, PSR OICs have not consistently set conditions for success in establishing chain of command relations. Since PSR Marines are co-located with reserve units throughout each Marine Corps Districts’ (MCD) area of operation, while the district’s PSR headquarters is potentially remotely located, several unit leaders do not have access to the entire chain of command, but rather retain access at the PSR recruiter level only.

#### A PSR Command under the Director, Reserve Affairs (HQMC) would Provide Accessibility to the PSR Chain of Command?

The majority of respondents, 72.2 percent (70 out of 97 respondents), indicated neutrality. Because of the strong neutral response and the inconclusive degree of agreement or disagreement, it is prudent to evaluate the qualitative responses which supported both agreement and disagreement. A respondent who agreed stated,

I do not know how to locate the PSR chain of command. Subordinate to Director, Reserve Affairs would facilitate a greater and stronger relationship between the supporting and supported relationship. Ideally there would be a list of open billets and on the same sheet would be the contact info for the associated PSR.

One who disagreed stated, “I think it is about the business. Is RA equipped to lead, manage, mentor, guide recruiters...better than recruiters?” Due to a lack of consistent accessibility to the PSR chain of command, some supported units are frustrated, though at the same time, some supported commands question the validity of placing PSR under the control of the Director, Reserve Affairs.

**The Command and Control of a PSR Command Outside of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command would Support my units’ Prior Service Recruitment needs?**

The majority of respondents, 65.3 percent (64 out 98 total respondents), indicated neutrality when asked this question, which was a slightly different variant than the previous sub-question. No qualitative response was elicited from this question. Based on the neutral result of the previous question, along with the neutral result here, the respondents consistently demonstrate that they do not have a strong opinion in either direction over a proposal to change the means by which the respondents’ units’ PSR support would be commanded and controlled.

**The Command and Control of PSR within the Reserve Component Changes Conditions for my Interaction with PSR?**

The majority of respondents, 57.1 percent (56 out of 98 total respondents), indicated neutrality when asked this question. Similar to previous sub-questions’ neutral responses, it is again prudent to assess qualitative responses which reflect both agreement and disagreement. A respondent who agreed, stated “RC to RC chain of command would increase interaction between PSR and RC units, logically, compared to RC to MCRC chain of command.” The lack of the common denominator of having the PSR element

commanded and controlled internal to the MCR, creates distance between PSR and the supported commands.

To the contrary, a respondent who disagreed, stated “I don’t think that it will have any change in my interaction with a PSR regardless of who is the chain of command.” This sub-question is ultimately inconclusive, although it is evident that some supported commands see the value in the PSR function emanating from the MCR, as opposed to from within MCRC, predicated on the reserve component buy-in.

#### Summary for Secondary Question Number five

Overall, the I&Is, reserve unit commanders and senior enlisted advisors are not supportive of a shift in the command and control of PSR under the Director, Reserve Affairs. In asking the supported key leaders about their respective views and experience in receipt of support from PSR, the majority of the Marines indicated general satisfaction with PSRs ability to recruit to their units’ PS personnel needs, independent of how PSR is commanded and controlled. With respect to having access to the PSR chain of command, the majority of the Marines are also satisfied with their ability to access the PSR chain of command. In their answers to the two survey questions about shifting command and control of PSR under the Director, Reserve Affairs, or shifting command and control outside of the MCRC, the majority of the Marines indicated neutrality, thus inconclusive results. When asked if a shift in the command and control of PSR would change conditions for their respective interaction with PSR, the majority of the Marines also indicated neutrality.

### Chapter Summary

With respect to the first of the secondary research questions, MCRC does not rely upon PSR in supporting the execution of the NPS reserve recruiting mission. Although both PS and the NPS reserve recruiting missions are executed by MCRC as a whole, the two types of recruiting are exclusive of one another in execution. If any referrals of applicants from either market are afforded to respective recruiters by the other category of recruiters, it is because of selfless initiative, as opposed to codified MCRC requirements to do so. Overall, PSR was successful as a separate command prior to its integration into MCRC in earnest in FY04, and has been successful since integration. PSRs long record of recruiting success demonstrates that its integration into MCRC did not facilitate its ability to successfully achieve its mission to partially populate the reserves with qualified Marines. MCRC achieves its annual NPS reserve recruiting goals, despite the MCRs lack of providing MCRC three percent of the NPS new contracts, from the reserve referral program.

Within the second of the secondary research questions, the current task organization of the PSR construct within MCRC does not provide for conditions of fairness and equitability among all assigned recruiting personnel. While less than a majority of AR, PSR personnel agreed that personnel evaluations are fair, it is evident by the mission data that NPS recruiting is the focus of recruiting within MCRC as a whole, and specifically within the MCD. The fact that PSR and NPS recruiting are considered distinctly separate recruiting missions among senior MCRC leaders, leads to the belief among many AR personnel that the unique, smaller PSR mission minimizes the opportunity for fairness in the evaluation process. The existence of a particular culture

within MCRC is anchored around two key areas: existence of formally screened RSCOs, and the existence of a community of NPS career recruiter (8412s). While there is nothing wrong with the presence of certain aspects of shared culture within MCRC, it is apparent that the reality of PSR OICs and PSR career recruiters (8412s), do not nest well within the larger MCRC culture, as the current task organization places PSR principally within the MCD construct.

In reference to the third secondary question, AR Marines are neutral in their inspiration to serve on PSR duty in its current construct. AR Marines generally believe that PSR is appropriately executed by MCRC, because of MCRCs professional ability to execute total force recruiting. Although MCRC is the right command structure in which to execute the overall command and control of PSR, it is believed that task organization of PSR within the MCD construct does not set conditions for fairness in personnel evaluations. Predicated on the distinct differences in size and scope of both the PS and NPS recruiting missions, AR officers in particular are skeptical as to how conditions for fairness exist within the MCD. RSCOs are formally selected for their duty, considered as the best and brightest the Marine Corps has to offer. No such selection process exists for AR officers, though the greatest percentage of AR officers who responded to the survey question believe it should exist. Aside from the current PSR populations' belief that their respective mission is generally viewed as less significant than their NPS counterparts' mission within the MCDs, PSR Marines are appreciative of the ability to be recognized for exceptional performance at the MCD and national levels. MCRC executes considerable care in making incentives available for high-performing personnel, both from the PS and NPS ranks.

Within the fourth secondary research question, the Marine Corps' AR program cannot currently source a PSR command HQ, though is capable of absorbing the manpower requirements to implement a stand-alone PSR command. AR structure reviews chartered by the Deputy Commandants of M&RA and CD&I have previously enabled AR structure change to be assessed and implemented, in support of emerging manpower requirements. Title 10, U.S.C. provides the foundation upon which the Marine Corps, and AR program in particular, may task organize in the execution of its statutory tasks. In contrast to the current MCRC total force recruiting construct and responsibility, the USAR provides a good example as to how it successfully executes its PS recruiting and retention mission external from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and internal to its reserve component.

From the fifth secondary research question, the I&Is, reserve unit commanders and senior enlisted advisors are not supportive of a shift in the command and control of PSR under the Director, Reserve Affairs. The majority of the supported unit key leaders indicated satisfaction with the level of service received from PSR. Reserve unit key leader satisfaction with PSRs current ability to recruit to their given units, coupled with their neutrality over shifting PSR responsibility outside of MCRC, does not lend to the supported units gaining benefit from a shift of command and control PSR under a different organization than MCRC. It indicates that the supported commands either simply don't share the view that changing the command and control of the PSR mission will have a greater positive impact on PSR fulfilling their units' needs, or their respective ability to access the PSR chain of command.

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<sup>1</sup>United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, mission data for FY06-FY12, electronic correspondence with author, 5 April 2013.

<sup>2</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Information Paper,” Marine Corps Reserve Support Command, 18 January 1997. Provided to author by the MCRC G-3, from historical files, 1 March 2013.

<sup>3</sup>United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, mission data for FY06-FY12.

<sup>4</sup>Manuel Munoz, “Analysis for the Screening and Selection Process for U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station Commanding Officers” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, March 2005), 9.

<sup>5</sup>Munoz, 9.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Milano and Selvage, 4-5.

<sup>9</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Information Paper,” Marine Corps Reserve Support Command, 18 January 1997. Provided to author from MCRC G-3 PSR, from historical files, 1 March 2013.

<sup>10</sup>United States Marine Corps, Correspondence between CG, MCRC, MajGen Parks and his subordinate commanders and staff, 25 April 2001. Provided to author from MCRC G-3 PSR, from historical files, 1 March 2013.

<sup>11</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for the Prior Service Recruiter, Volume VIII* (Quantico, VA.: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 22 April 2011), 3-2.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for Recruiting Operations, Volume III* (Quantico, VA.: Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 21 March 2004), 5-1.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 5-4.

<sup>15</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for the Prior Service Recruiter, Volume VIII*, 3-2.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>United States Marine Corps, *Guidebook for Recruiting Operations, Volume III*, 5-2.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 5-F-1.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 5-F-2.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>U.S.C. Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, § 12310 Reserves.

<sup>22</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Marine Recruiters Succeed in FY12,” <http://www.mcrc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/5320/Article/134440/marine-recruiters-succeed-in-fy12.aspx> (accessed 1 December 2012).

<sup>23</sup>Munoz, 9.

<sup>24</sup>Department of Defense, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2013*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/mil.pdf> (accessed 2 January 2013).

<sup>25</sup>United States Army Reserve, “Shaping and Sustaining Army Reserve Strength” (PowerPoint, 20 August 2012).

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Milano and Selvage, iv.

<sup>28</sup>United States Marine Corps, Correspondence between CG, MCRC, MajGen Parks and his subordinate commanders and staff, 25 April 2001. Provided to author from MCRC G-3 PSR, from historical files, 1 March 2013.

<sup>29</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Warning Order and Command Shift with Integration of PSR within MCRC.”

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>United States Marine Corps, Table of Organization, 9th Marine Corps District, Total Force Structure Division (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 5 October 2012).

<sup>32</sup>George Meehan and Samuel Clonts, et al., “Information Paper,” 3 November 2006. Provided to the author from historical files at RA Division, HQMC, 28 November 2012, 1.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>United States Marine Corps, MCO 1001.52J, *Active Reserve Support to the United States Marine Corps Reserve* (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2011), 2-13.

<sup>38</sup>United States Marine Corps, “Active Reserve Authorized Strength Report (ASR),” August 2012, Electronic correspondence with author, 28 November 2012.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The continuous employment of the RC has produced a core of combat experienced officers and enlisted leaders who are the future of the reserve component. These individuals have gained invaluable experience in balancing the needs and demands of their family, civilian employer, and of the Marine Corps and have created a nucleus of combat leaders that will serve as a source of strength as MFR transitions to meet the challenges of the future security environment. Additionally, the continued recruitment of prior service Marines to the RC makes for a more ready and responsive RC and enhances the Total Force's return on investment.

—LtGen Steven Hummer, *CMFR Vision and Strategy 2012-2017*

#### Conclusions

The United States Marine Corps is a robust, war fighting organization. The integration of the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) into the total force construct as a whole, is a key strength that the Marine Corps exerts in support of the United States' national military strategy, the national defense strategy and the overall national security strategy. In order to ultimately man, train and equip forces for the execution of national military objectives, personnel procurement is a critical component of the process required to enable task organized, war fighting forces. The Marine Corps maintains a robust recruiting entity, which executes procurement of all non-prior service personnel, as well as prior service personnel, comprised of active duty personnel and reservists. The research conducted within this study yielded that the execution of the reserve Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) is not ideally commanded and controlled by the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), while the current construct provides minimal career-enhancing opportunities for the Marines who conduct PSR. There are two primary

implications derived from the research: (1) the establishment of priority of PSR as a distinct recruiting activity is placed at too low of an echelon of command within MCRC, and (2) the current task organization of PSR assets within the Marine Corps District (MCD) construct causes a conflict of culture on recruiting duty, to the chagrin of the PSR personnel. The research disproved the hypothesis that PSR should be operationally shifted outside of MCRC and placed under the Director, Reserve Affairs.

#### The Marine Corps' Responsibility in Contribution to the Operational Reserve

The Marine Corps' total force construct resulting from the aggregation of the active and reserve components, necessitates that the MCR be adequately manned through NPS and PS recruiting. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (CMFR), has identified personnel recruitment into the reserves as a matter of strategic priority within his current vision and strategy. From the position of the senior Marine Corps General Officer responsible for the largest command in the Marine Corps, recruiting qualified personnel into the reserve units is critical towards Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) fulfilling its major responsibility in augmenting the operational reserve construct. By virtue of the Marine Corps' 2001 decision to integrate PSR into MCRC, and subsequent placement of PSR under the command and control of the MCD COs, the current priority of reserve PS recruiting is misplaced. The priority rests predominately on the PSR OIC, who is one of six AR Majors arbitrarily assigned to PSR OIC duty, through ordinary personnel assignment practices. Approximately 89 percent to 93 percent of the MCD COs total force recruiting mission rests in the NPS realm, clearly demonstrating that reserve PS recruiting is not the priority of the MCD CO or above, within the MCRC chain of

command. The gap that exists between the current task organization of PSR within the MCD and the strategic priority of reserve personnel recruitment, requires creative adjustments in order to minimize the critical vulnerability, and to maximize the opportunities and morale of all personnel involved.

#### Conflict of Culture

Organizational culture defined by noted author Edgar Schein, is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration . . . therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.”<sup>1</sup> At all echelons of command within MCRC, from the Commanding General (CG), through CGs of both Eastern and Western Recruiting Regions and through to their subordinate MCD Commanding Officers, NPS recruiting accounts for generally between 89 percent to 93 percent of the Marine Corps’ annual total force recruiting mission. The remaining approximate seven percent to 11 percent of the total force recruiting mission rests in the numeric requirements to affiliate qualified Marines into the MCR. Predicated on the size and scope of the NPS recruiting mission, there are two key cultural biases organizationally anchored in MCRC: (1) only highly qualified officers selected through a formal RSCO screening process are considered truly capable of leading Marines on recruiting duty, and (2) that PSR career recruiters and recruiters are not equals with NPS career recruiters and recruiters.

Within a given MCD, there are eight subordinate RSCOs, executing the approximate 89 percent to 93 percent of the MCD COs total force mission. Each RSCO is responsible for his or her nearly equal share of the MCDs NPS recruiting mission. The

PSR OIC, as the ninth Major who a given MCD CO evaluates, does not fit into the cultural paradigm, due to his or her lack of board selection, coupled with his or her responsibility for the smallest portion of the MCD COs total force mission. Because of this cultural difference, belief among AR officers is that conditions do not wholly exist for fairness in the personnel evaluation process, while PSR is task organized within the MCD construct. NPS recruiting and PS recruiting are two distinct forms of recruiting, yet all recruiting personnel within the MCD are ultimately evaluated against one other, in their respective billets and ranks. The PSR OICs are evaluated against the RSCOs by the MCD CO as the reporting senior, while the subordinate PSR career recruiters and recruiters are evaluated against NPS career recruiters and recruiters, with the MCD CO as the reviewing officer. The research revealed that an AR officer's assignment to PSR duty, within the extant conditions, does not provide for a broader extrinsic motivation to serve in such duty, in terms of having an opportunity to compete with and excel among his or her peers. In order for PSR personnel to equitably compete in the personnel evaluation process, they need to be task organized and evaluated along with their peers across the PSR force, who perform similar missions and tasks.

PSR career recruiters (8412) and recruiters (8411), are viewed by their NPS counterparts as non-equals. Although the two distinct types of recruiting personnel are codified under a single MOS, the individual recruiting tasks that they perform are different, thus the prevailing view of the Marines themselves. The research revealed that Marine Corps systematic recruiting, while ostensibly the same between both recruiting markets, diverges from the beginning of the system, through the different means by which PSR and NPS recruiters execute their systematic contact to contract, or contact to

affiliate chains. Apart from the aspects of selling the Marine Corps to prospective applicants, the two types of recruiters perform differently in their ways and means. With respect to career recruiters (8412), there is a wide gap between NPS recruiting and PSR. NPS career recruiters, highly skilled in their trade, significantly contribute to the leadership of the Marine Corps' overall personnel procurement mission. An NPS career recruiter withstands a greater degree of adversity in his or her positions of leadership, largely predicated on the size of the mission, as well as through the execution of the required oversight and training within the systematic recruiting process, which largely defines the cultural paradigm. PSR career recruiters and recruiters would be much better suited to perform in a singularly focused PSR organization, in which they can ultimately earn their individual performance evaluations solely rated against one another of like grade, performing within similar expectations.

### Recommendations

#### Proposed Chain of Command and PSR HQ Table of Organization

The research revealed MCRC is the right command in which PSR should function. To maintain total force integration practices between the active and reserve components is optimal for the Marine Corps as a whole. Re-aligning the task organization of PSR assets within MCRC will enable the posturing of requisite degree of priority in meeting the CMCs long-term ability to leverage the reserve component through CMFRs strategy for refining the operational reserve construct, as well eliminating the current conflict of culture. While not an original idea, research revealed that the standing up of a PSR command within MCRC, which is specifically designed to execute the PSR mission,

is the means to achieve long-range health within the MCR, and foundationally increasing the morale of PSR personnel. Integral to the proposed PSR chain of command is the coordination mechanism between CG, MCRC, and CMFR, through the newly established CO, PSR. Figure 7 depicts the proposed recruiting chain of command.




Figure 7. Proposed U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Chain of Command

*Source:* Created by author.

The decision to establish a PSR command internal to MCRC necessitates an AR program structure review, in order to adequately account for the required personnel allocations for the PSR headquarters (HQ). The proposed table of organization of the PSR command HQ closely resembles the functionality of an existing MCD HQ, though with reductions in personnel, particularly civilian personnel. The proposed PSR HQ would be comprised of 32 personnel (6 officers, 25 enlisted and 1 civilian). The PSR command would be commanded by an AR Colonel, who possesses the requisite degree of experience across all Title 10 aspects of support to the MCR, as well as having withstood the rigor of the command screening process. The PSR HQ should be co-located with MCRC at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va. Table 11 depicts the proposed PSR HQ table of organization.

Table 11. Proposed PSR Command Headquarters Structure

Section	MOS	Field Grade	Co Grade	SNCO (8412)	SNCO	NCO & below	CIV	Total
PSR HQ Section								
CO (Colonel)	80XX	1						
XO (LtCol)	8006	1						
SgtMaj**	8999				1			
Career Planner (SSgt)	4821				1			
Family Readiness Officer	CIV						1	
PSR HQ Section Totals		2	0	0	2	0	1	
Consolidated Administration Sect								
Admin Officer/Adjutant (Capt)	0180		1					
Admin Chief (MSgt)	0193				1			
Admin Marines (NCOs)	0111					6		
Consolidated Admin Sect Totals		0	1	0	1	6	0	
Operations Section								
Operations Officer (Maj)	8006	1						
Operations Chief (MGySgt)	8412			1				
Operations Clerk (NCO)	0111					1		
Training Team Chief (MGySgt)	8412			1				
Training Team Marines (SNCO)	8412			3				
Marketing Marines (SNCO)	8412			2				
Operations Section Total		1	0	7	0	1	0	
PSR Logistics/Supply Section								
Logistics/Supply Officer (Maj)	3002	1						
Logistics Chief (GySgt)	0491				1			
Supply/Log Marines (NCOs)	3043					3		
Fiscal Chief (SSgt)	34XX				1			
PSR Log/Supply Sect Totals		1	0	0	2	3	0	
MCRC Liaison Officer (Capt)	8006		1					
MCRC Liaison Chief (GySgt)	8412			1				
PSR Basic Course Staff (GySgts)	8412			2				
PSR Command HQ Totals		4	2	10	5	10	1	32

Source: Created by author.

With internal compensatory analysis and concurrence from the major commands in which AR personnel are presently sourced, the Marine Corps' AR program can allocate all but two billets within the proposed HQ structure, with zero growth to AR end strength realized: (1) Sergeant Major, and (2) Family Readiness Officer. The Sergeant

Major would have to be sourced from the active component, as the AR program structure does not include Sergeants Major or First Sergeants (8999 MOS). The presence of a senior enlisted advisor within the PSR command would enable a robust, senior enlisted leader among the staff non-commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers within the command. The Sergeant Major should have experience on Inspector-Instructor duty, hence understand the intricacies of manning, training and equipping units in the MCR. The alignment of a Family Readiness Officer billet does not necessarily require the creation of new civilian structure, but perhaps re-aligning existing civilian structure from elsewhere in the Marine Corps. Table 12 depicts the total proposed structure by grade and MOS in the proposed PSR HQ. Table 13 depicts the differences between currently aligned PSR structure at the MCRC and Region HQs, versus the proposed PSR HQ structure, to be addressed through the unit tables of organization and equipment change (TOECR) process.

Table 12. Proposed PSR Command HQ Grade/MOS Structure Requirements

Rank	80XX	8999	8006	0180	3002	0193	4821	0111	0491	3043	34XX	8412	CIV
Col	1												
LtCol			1										
Maj			1		1								
Capt/1stLt			1	1									
SgtMaj**		1											
MGySgt												2	
MSgt						1						2	
GySgt							1		1			6	
SSgt											1		
NCO and Below								7		3			
Civilian												1	
Total	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	7	1	3	1	10	1
											Total		32

*Source:* Created by author.

Table 13. Differences of PSR MCRC/Region HQ Billets vs. Proposed PSR HQ

Rank	80XX	8999	8006	0180	3002	0193	4821	0111	0491	3043	34XX	8412	CIV
Col	-1												
LtCol													
Maj			2		-1								
Capt/1stLt				-1									
SgtMaj**		-1											
MGySgt													
MSgt					-1								
GySgt						-1		-1					
SSgt											-1		
NCO and Below								-6		-3			
Civilian													-1
Total	-1	-1	2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-6	-1	-3	-1	0	-1
											Total		-16

*Source:* Created by author. Synthesized from existing PSR structure versus the proposed PSR command HQ structure.

Apart from the sourcing of the Sergeant Major and the Family Readiness Officer from non-AR personnel, The AR Colonel would have to be re-aligned from among the 32 statutorily provided structure for AR Colonels. Of the two extant PSR-aligned, AR Majors' billets (8006 MOS), these would be available for conversion to the proposed structure's Adjutant (0180) and Supply/Logistics Officer (3002). The Adjutant billet would also be a grade reduction from Major to Captain. With respect to the remaining proposed structure requirements, specific realignment of billet structure from current PSR allocations and further internal compensation would be necessary to achieve zero growth in AR structure end strength.

In addition to the creation of the stand-alone PSR command internal to MCRC and its requisite HQ personnel structure, the PSR OIC billets should be codified as Prior

Service Recruiting Station Commanding Officer (PSRSCO) billets. As a matter of consistency within the Marine Corps at large and specifically within MCRC, officers responsible for the accomplishment of an assigned mission, along with the responsibility for all assigned personnel and equipment, naturally carry the burden of command. In order to fully legitimize the newly aligned PSR command structure, subordinate PSRSCOs should be board selected, mirroring the RSCO selection process. The same board that convenes to select the next fiscal year's grouping of RSCOs, can easily execute the screening and selection of the next fiscal year's grouping of PSRSCOs. The command-screening of the CO, PSR and board selection of the subordinate PSRSCOs, presents PSR Marines with highly qualified officers in charge of them. Reserve Affairs Manpower Management (RAM) would provide the list of eligible AR officers to MCRC for the conduct of the selection process. The resultant release of the board's selections would all be included on the same Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) , in order to publicly identify whom the CMC approved for service as RSCOs and PSRSCOs.

#### **Recommended Further Study**

Beyond the scope of this study, there are two critical areas recommended for further study: (1) fiscal considerations in undertaking such comprehensive action in standing up a PSR command, and all associated budgetary issues, and (2) defining the PSRS areas of responsibility, to determine how the national PSR structure can be specifically aligned in support of fulfilling needs of supported reserve units.

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<sup>1</sup>Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3d ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 17.

## GLOSSARY

Active Reserve program. This Marine Corps Reserve program is comprised of the cadre of reserve component officers and enlisted personnel who serve in roles principally in support of the Marine Corps Reserve at the seat of government, within major command headquarters, or within other categories of commands or organizations which have influence over the execution of Title 10 responsibilities, in support of the Marine Corps Reserve, in terms of organizing, administering, recruiting or training the reserves.

Command-screening. The lawful process by which military departments/branches execute the selection from an eligible population of officers, the Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, Commanders and Captains, who will assume command of organizations within their respective military branches. These officers, upon assumption of command, possess the ability to execute all inherent functions of command.

## APPENDIX A

CGSC Approved Survey Instrument Number 13-03-053  
Executed on 4-13 March 2013

### Current Slate of I&I's/Reserve Unit Commanders and Senior Enlisted Advisors

1. Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) fulfills my units' prior service personnel requirements?
  - 1a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
2. The PSR chain of command is accessible to me?
  - 2a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
3. A PSR command under the Director, Reserve Affairs (HQMC) would provide accessibility to the PSR chain of command?
  - 3a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
4. The command and control of PSR within the reserve component changes conditions for my interaction with PSR?
  - 4a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
5. The command and control of a PSR command outside of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command would support my units' prior service recruitment needs?

### All Current AR Officers

1. The placement of Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) billets under the command and control of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command positively affects my desire to serve on PSR duty?
  - 1a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
2. Placement of PSR billets under the command and control of a different Marine Corps agency (other than MCRC) would positively affect my desire to serve on PSR duty?
  - 2a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
3. Assigning a command screened, AR Colonel to command and control the PSR force creates greater career opportunity for AR officers?
  - 3a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
4. The establishment of a formal PSR OIC selection board will attract more Officers to serve on PSR duty?

Current District Command Groups, Region and MCRC level staffs

1. PSRs influence in the districts' NPS reserve recruiting mission is required for the District to accomplish its NPS reserve recruiting mission?
  - 1a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
2. NPS and Prior Service Recruiting missions are similar missions?
  - 2a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
3. RSCOs have a more difficult recruiting mission than PSR OICs?
  - 3a. Please explain agreement or disagreement?
4. PSR OICs should be board selected, similar to RSCOs?
5. PSR Career Recruiter SNCOICs perform the same mission as NPS Career Recruiter SNCOICs?
  - 5a. Please explain your agreement or disagreement
6. PSR recruiters (8411s) conduct the same mission as NPS recruiters (8411s)?
  - 6a. Please explain your agreement or disagreement.

District level PSR Personnel

1. PSR personnel are fairly evaluated?
  - 1a. Please explain your agreement or disagreement?
2. A PSR tour of duty within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command was one of your top three choices for duty assignment?
3. Marine Corps Recruiting Command provides incentives for you to earn recognition through exceptional performance?
  - 3a. Please explain your agreement or disagreement?

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